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ABSTRACT 
 
Financing Smallholder Agribusiness in Zambia: An Economic Analysis of the ZATAC 
Model. (August 2008) 
Brian Namushi Mwanamambo, B.Eng., University of Zambia 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Victoria Salin 
 
This study investigates the case of a Zambian institution providing credit for smallholder 
agribusiness commercialization and compares this lender’s model with the major 
microfinance institutions, to identify specific mechanisms employed by the lender and 
how these have been adapted to suit seasonal agricultural production credit 
requirements.  Econometric models are developed to examine the influence of key 
economic factors such as nominal and real interest rates, loan fees, and loan term on the 
supply of credit by the lender.  Other important factors considered relevant in the 
lender’s market include availability of contract markets for financed production and the 
type of borrower (cooperative or investor-owned agribusinesses). 
The study uses loan-level and firm-level loan data aggregated from an electronic 
loan database of individual loan files kept by the lender.  Cross sectional data over three 
years (2005 – 2007) are used in the study. 
The study finds that loan fees, loan term and availability of contract markets to 
borrowers are the key determinants of credit supply. In addition, the study finds that 
interest rates do not significantly influence the lender’s credit supply decisions, a finding 
 iv
that is consistent with literature on credit rationing in markets with asymmetric 
information. The study finds no evidence of economies of scale benefit to the lender 
being passed along to borrowers through lower loan fees. 
The study contributes to the literature and development needs of agricultural 
lenders and smallholder agribusinesses in Zambia through the analysis of different 
factors that influence the lender’s credit supply decisions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Smallholder agricultural producers in developing countries face many challenges in 
accessing credit to enhance production and increase the profitability of their activities.  
For reasons mostly related to smallholder producers’ inability to provide adequate 
collateral for loans, the commercial banking sector tends to shun lending to this category 
of borrowers.  On the other hand, lenders face difficulties in lending to resource-poor 
smallholder producers due to the high default risk associated with such borrowers.   
As a result, smallholder producers cannot expand their businesses, and cannot 
grow to a level that would enable them to borrow from the banks.  The consequence of 
this is that even when they have viable projects, rural smallholders often find themselves 
in a poverty trap, with the only option being local money lenders with attendant high 
interest rates. 
To address these constraints, microfinance institutions have emerged, in the last 
two decades, with mechanisms that have been noted for their ability to minimize risks of 
lending to smallholders.  The popularity of microfinance has mainly been with its use of 
various innovative approaches to providing financial services to the poor, who would not  
 
 
 
 
_________________ 
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qualify for these services from the conventional formal lending institutions.  
Microfinance has been broadly defined as the provision of a broad range of financial 
services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to 
poor and low-income households and their micro enterprises (Asian Development Bank, 
2000). 
A number of studies have been conducted to understand the specific features that 
have enabled microfinance institutions to lend profitably to the poor, usually recording 
higher loan repayment rates than commercial banks while fostering growth in the real 
net worth of their borrowers.  Morduch (1999) examines some important mechanisms 
used by microfinance institutions by comparing institutions that were diverse in the type 
of models they used and their target groups.  Morduch’s study identifies five key 
mechanisms employed by these institutions to achieve high repayment rates, namely, 
peer selection, peer monitoring, progressive lending, regular repayment schedules and 
the use of collateral substitutes.  These mechanisms are described in detail in the 
literature review section. 
Much of the literature has been on microfinance programs that are focused on 
consumer loans and very short-term loans to merchandizing micro-enterprises, and very 
little on agricultural loans.  This is mainly because the high risks inherent in seasonal 
agricultural production tend to deter micro lending programs from financing such 
activities.  Another factor is that, in some developing country markets, land owners are 
relatively well-off and are not targets of development assistance (Yunus 1999).  This 
research investigates the case of a Zambian institution – ZATAC Limited – providing 
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credit for smallholder agribusiness commercialization and compares this lender’s model 
with the major microfinance models studied by Morduch, to identify specific 
mechanisms employed by the former and how these have been adapted to suit 
agricultural production credit requirements.  Econometric models are developed to 
analyze how the key economic variables, interest rates, loan fees, and loan term, and 
borrower characteristics affect the lender’s credit supply and how these in turn affect the 
lender’s sustainability. 
Problem Statement and Justification 
Many banks in Zambia avoid lending to smallholder agricultural producers as they are 
perceived to be high risk borrowers.  The smallholder farmers turn to microfinance 
lenders and outgrower schemes to finance their production.  An outgrower scheme is a 
contract farming scheme in which the lender (usually an agribusiness firm) provides 
inputs such as seed, chemicals or equipment, to small-scale farmers with a contract that 
requires the borrower to sell all the financed production to the lender, and the lender 
guarantees a market for the produce at contracted prices.  The microfinance lenders 
which provide credit to the ‘risky’ borrowers often lack the analytical tools for making 
sound lending decisions that are employed by commercial banks.  Without these tools, 
the lenders have three alternatives: (i) charge very high interest to mitigate the effects of 
high risk of default, (ii) charge ‘fair’ interest rates but only be able to remain in business 
through donor subsidies, or (iii) if un-subsidized, risk going out of business.  This study 
contributes to the literature and development needs of smallholder lenders in Zambia by 
documenting mechanisms used by a Zambian microfinance institution, analyzing its 
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credit supply characteristics, and how supply affects its sustainability.  The data are from 
a leading agricultural lender in Zambia and have not previously been examined in a 
formal study. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the influence of economic and business 
factors, and borrower characteristics on credit supply by an agricultural microfinance 
institution, and hence on the sustainability of the lender.  The specific objectives are: 
(i) To fully describe the microfinance loan contract mechanisms 
employed by the lender, how they are adapted for the situation in 
Zambian agriculture as compared to those employed by major 
microfinance programs in other developing countries, and consider 
how these contract mechanisms jointly affect the lender’s supply of 
credit. 
(ii) To analyze the influence of economic factors and business conditions 
on supply of credit to borrowers in a quantitative model. 
 
Organization of Thesis 
Chapter II describes the relevant literature, beginning with the basic economic logic 
behind lender-borrower financing decisions using a two-period intertemporal choice 
framework.  This is followed by the more advanced theory of credit rationing, which 
exists in the presence of information asymmetries, or incomplete information – an 
important problem in developing country credit markets.  The next section then turns to 
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a discussion of microfinance and a description of common loan contract mechanisms 
employed by microfinance institutions to ameliorate the incentives for borrowers to 
default given the information asymmetries.  In chapter III, the financial environment and 
smallholders’ access to credit in Zambia are described.  Chapter IV discusses the data 
and methodology used in the study, and tests conducted on the data to ensure that the 
models used to estimate supply are robust.  In chapter V the results of the study are 
presented followed by a discussion of economic significance of these results to lenders, 
borrowers and policymakers.  Chapter VI summarizes the study findings and synthesizes 
the key conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter discusses literature relevant to the analysis of credit supply in the context of 
an agricultural microfinance lender in a developing country. An examination of the 
theories underlying lender-borrower choices in credit markets is given, followed by the 
issue of credit rationing in a market with significant information asymmetries as the one 
in which this lender operates. The mechanisms commonly employed by microfinance 
institutions to ameliorate these information asymmetries and improve lending efficiency 
are also outlined.  A discussion of the costs and returns of agricultural credit delivery 
then follows, drawing from studies on developed country markets.  The chapter 
concludes with literature on the assessment of the financial conditions of a lender, based 
on studies from both developed and developing country credit markets. 
Lender – Borrower Choices in Credit Markets 
Agricultural lenders operate in the financial markets, which are economic in nature but 
affected by complexities of risk and timing.  This section discusses the basic economic 
logic behind financing decisions.  Financing decisions arise because individuals can 
choose to maximize their utility over multiple periods of time, in addition to choosing 
between different goods based on the prices of the goods relative to their contribution to 
the individual’s utility.   Consider a simple two-period conceptual framework (Nicholson 
2005).   The consumer chooses between consumption in the present or consumption in 
the future, subject to a constraint that reflects current income.  The consumer has the 
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option of investing the portion of income not spent on present consumption and earning 
a rate of return.  Successful investment or savings enable future consumption to be 
greater than would otherwise have been possible.   
The two-period consumption choice can be represented graphically, as depicted 
in figure 1.  Present consumption is represented by C0, while future consumption is 
represented by C1.   The individual’s budget constraint is represented by  
 
(1)     0 1 1I C PC= + ,   
 
        
where P1 represents the present cost of future consumption and I represents current 
income.  The “price” of future consumption is re-written in the financial discounting 
style as:  
(2)     
rC
CP +== 1
1
1
0
1 Δ
Δ ,           
  
where r represents the rate of return between the current and future periods.  Combining 
the two equations yields a budget constraint of:   
(3)       
r
CCI ++= 1
1
0  . 
 
              
Utility for this individual is maximized at C0*, C1*.  By rearranging the terms in the 
budget constraint and substituting for P1, future consumption can also be found: 
(4)     
*
* 0
1
1
( )I CC
P
−=  ,             
  
(5)     * *1 0( )(1C I C r)= − + .             
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Equation (5) means that current savings, (I – C0*), can be invested at rate of return r to 
yield C1* in the next consumption period.  The concept of utility maximization is 
illustrated in figure 1.  For a general utility function, U, an individual will choose to 
maximize their utility by consuming at point C*1 and C*0, the point of tangency of the 
individual’s utility function and the budget constraint.    
 
    Future Consumption (C1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Budget Constraint I = C0 + P1C1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Intertemporal Utility Maximization 
 
The key implications from this simple two-period framework are: 
1. The ratio of marginal utilities over consumption in the two periods 
determines the choice of savings and investment. 
2. The rate of return, r, is a key determining factor in the choice of consumption 
or savings. 
U0 
C1* 
Current Consumption (C0) C0* 
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It is straight forward to adapt the model above to the situation of a consumer who would 
prefer to borrow.  Very low income individuals face a budget constraint so tight that C0 
is inadequate for sustaining their consumption needs.  In this instance, demand for 
loanable funds exists to allow the budget constraint to be relaxed.  For simplicity, 
consider an individual whose current consumption is equal to income.  Saving and 
investment for this individual is zero, unless he or she borrows.  If the individual 
borrows an amount B, then we can write the new budget constraint as: 
 
(6)    
t
b
tt
g
r
rB
r
CC
r
Br
BI +
++++=+++ 1
)1(
11
1
0    
  
where rb is the cost of borrowed capital and rt is the individual’s discount factor, which 
takes into account the individual’s risk aversion or intertemporal impatience, and rg is 
the rate of return on the borrower’s investment.  Rearranging equation (6), we can solve 
for future consumption, C1, 
(7)      
t
b
t
g
t r
BrBC
r
Br
BI
r
C
+
+−−+++=+ 1
)(
11 0
1  ,   
(8)   )()1()1()1( 01 btgtt BrBrCBrrBrIC +−+−++++= , 
(9)   )1()1)(( 01 bgt rBBrrCBIC +−++−+= .  
 
Equation (9) shows that for the individual to maximize utility to yield consumption, C1, 
in period two, the amount repaid in principal and interest on borrowed funds, rb, must be 
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less than the sum of the return on the borrowed amount and gains on investment, rg, as 
discounted by the individual’s own discount factor. 
A common source of the demand for loanable funds is entrepreneurs wanting to 
take advantage of business opportunities.  Consider a situation in which investment 
opportunities are too costly to be financed out of current income.  That is, I – C0 for an 
individual is small.  The borrowed funds, B, are spent on a risky investment project 
which yields returns at a rate r.  The utility maximizer can attain a higher indifference 
curve (U1) when borrowing to invest in opportunities that allow higher future 
consumption.  When the investment outcome is successful, lenders receive the borrowed 
principal (B) plus interest (at the prior agreed rate, rb).  The investor has greater 
consumption possibilities in the future, as seen by the outward shift of the vertical 
intercept in the budget line (figure 2).  
Borrowing for investment opportunity 
U1 
U0 
C1 
Current income 
Current consumption
Future consumption 
C0 
  
Figure 2. Intertemporal Utility Maximization with Borrowing 
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From the equation for the budget constraint with borrowing (equation 6), the 
expected return on investment rt must equal or exceed the cost of borrowed funds rb in 
order for a rational individual to borrow. 
The borrower faces the prospect that the risky project will not succeed, in which 
case the payoff structure takes the form of an option.  Borrowed funds B are not repaid, 
and C1 is limited to the amount saved.  The borrower’s payoff is represented by an 
asymmetric function, which illustrates the incentive to default.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
borrower’s option to default.  The total value of the investment in period 2 is R. Because 
the project is a risky venture, outcomes for R can be anywhere along the horizontal axis, 
from worthless to a large amount.  When R is resolved at a large value, the borrower has 
an incentive to repay the loan plus interest and gains positive payoff of the project value 
R above the debt repayment.  When R is small, or when 0, the borrower has the incentive 
to default.  The borrower’s payoff is a call option, or opportunity to reduce losses to 0 
through defaulting on debt B. 
 
Pa
yo
ff
 
B (1 + rb) 
R 0 
Lo
ss
 
 
Figure 3. Borrower’s Payoff Structure with Default Option 
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Ignoring all social or institutional pressures for the moment, the payoff to a 
borrower can be represented in monetary terms as: 
max[0, (1 )]bR B rπ = − + , 
where R is the total value of the investment in period 2. 
The economic incentive to borrow is to increase utility.  A key factor in 
borrowing is the cost of funds or interest on borrowed funds.  When borrowed funds are 
used in risky projects, there is an economic incentive for the borrower to default.  These 
features of demand for credit have implications for the willingness of lenders to supply 
financing.  The lender’s position given the default option for the borrower above can 
also be diagramed as shown in figure 4. 
  
B (1 + rb) R B
Pa
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ff
 
rbB 
0 
- B 
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ss
 
 
Figure 4. Lender’s Payoff Structure with Default Option 
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The lender’s payoff structure can be presented in the form of a sale of a put 
option to the borrower by the lender.  If the borrower’s project outcomes are poor, the 
debt contract gives the borrower the right to sell the project to the lender for the 
borrowed amount B.  The lender, as the seller of the put option, does not have a choice.  
From the lender’s perspective, the payoff RL can be represented as: 
BrRB bL ≤≤− . 
The lender thus has an asymmetric payoff structure as a result of the option to 
default.  The borrower, on the other hand has an incentive to make more risky 
investments when his or her downside risk is hedged by the put option. 
These incentives illustrate the difficulties that lenders face with asymmetric 
information about potential borrowers.  Institutions have developed to ameliorate some 
risks in credit provision.  For example, contract terms exist in credit markets to mitigate 
this clear incentive for borrowers to default.  These contract terms include the 
microfinance loan contract mechanisms discussed in detail later, such as joint liability 
(which entails peer monitoring), peer selection, progressive lending, and regular 
repayments.  Before discussing the development of microfinance and the mechanisms 
used by these institutions, the following section discusses rationing in credit markets and 
why credit rationing occurs. 
Credit Rationing 
In-depth analysis of the incentive issues that occur in the market for borrowed funds has 
shown that credit markets are an instance in which the pricing mechanism – interest rates 
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– cannot efficiently allocate funds in certain circumstances.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
show that even in equilibrium, the loanable funds market may be characterized by credit 
rationing. 
Formally, credit rationing is defined as the circumstance when, among loan 
applicants who appear identical, some receive a loan while others do not; and the 
rejected applicants do not receive a loan even if they offer to pay higher interest rates.  
“Criterion a rationing” occurs when, among observationally identical borrowers, some 
get loans and others do not, and the rationed borrowers cannot get credit at any interest 
rate.  A second type of credit rationing (criterion b rationing) occurs when entire types 
cannot get credit at any interest rate, although they would get credit if the supply of 
funds were sufficiently large.  This type of rationing is often termed “redlining” (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1987).   
The interest rates received on a loan and the riskiness of the loan are both of 
concern to banks making loans.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that the latter affects the 
former in two ways: first, through the bank’s attempt to sort the potential borrowers to 
identify borrowers who are more likely to repay, called the adverse selection effect; and 
second, through the actions of borrowers – the incentive effect.  In the first of these 
effects, the bank uses the interest rate as a screening device: those willing to pay high 
interest rates may, on average, be riskier borrowers because they perceive their 
probability of repaying the loan to be low.  The incentive effect occurs because higher 
interest rates decrease the return on projects that succeed and induce firms to undertake 
projects with higher payoffs when they succeed, but with lower probabilities of success.   
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As the interest rate increases, the more risk averse borrowers do not borrow as their 
projects become infeasible, leaving only the risky borrowers in the market.  Thus, even if 
demand increases, lenders do not respond to higher demand by adjusting their prices.  
The risk-increasing effect of interest expense and the screening effect of high interest 
rates give rise to credit rationing.  Theoretically, there is a concave relationship between 
the bank’s expected returns and the interest rate charged (figure 5). Note that there is no 
incentive for the bank to lend at interest rates greater than r*. 
r* Interest rate 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n 
to
 th
e 
B
an
k 
Figure 5. Critical Interest Rate that Maximizes Return to the Bank 
Source: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
  
When lenders require collateral, some problems in the credit market may be 
alleviated because the lender’s expected return is increased by the collateral asset.  The 
borrower’s payoff structure changes as well, to 
(10)      ( )[ ]CBrRrR bb −+−= ;)1(max),(π . 
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The entrepreneur has two possible outcomes from this venture.  First, if successful, the 
project will pay off returns R, hence the borrower receives R less principal and interest 
repaid at rate rb on the borrowed amount B.  Alternatively, the project is a failure and the 
borrower defaults, losing the collateral pledged (C). 
As illustrated above, collateral can serve to directly minimize the loss to the 
lender if the borrower’s project is unsuccessful, or to indirectly minimize losses by 
minimizing the incentive for the borrower to default.  Banks therefore commonly lend 
only to borrowers who can provide collateral.  However, poor people usually do not 
have assets of significant value to pledge as collateral in order to obtain bank loans.  As 
a result, this group of potential borrowers can not obtain loans from the banks.  Can 
credit without collateral work?  The next section shows that microfinance institutions 
have developed mechanisms that enable them to successfully lend to the poor. 
Developments in Microfinance 
Microfinance is a relatively new concept in the finance world that has rapidly evolved in 
the last two decades.  Microfinance institutions use various innovative approaches to 
provide financial services to the poor, who would not qualify for these services from the 
conventional formal lending institutions.  Microfinance has been broadly defined as the 
provision of a broad range of financial services such as deposits, loans, payment 
services, money transfers, and insurance to poor and low-income households and their 
micro enterprises (Asian Development Bank 2000).  Unable to provide sufficient 
collateral to obtain loans from the traditional banking system, even when they have 
viable projects, the rural poor often found themselves in a poverty trap, with the only 
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option being local money lenders who charge very high interest rates.  The advent of 
microfinance has seen a considerable shift in access to financial services by rural people 
in many developing countries that some have called “local revolutions” (Madajewicz 
2003). 
The developments in microfinance in the last two decades have sparked interest 
in multilateral lending agencies, bilateral donor agencies, developing and developed 
country governments, non-government organizations (NGOs) and a variety of private 
banking institutions to support its development (Asian Development Bank 2000).  The 
2006 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and a pioneer of microfinance, demonstrates the importance 
microfinance has been given as a practical solution to poverty alleviation and the 
economic development of developing nations.  In awarding the prize, the Nobel 
Foundation stated that the prize was being awarded for the recipients’ “efforts to create 
economic and social development from below” (Nobel Foundation 2006). 
A wide range of studies have been conducted to understand the specific features 
that have enabled microfinance institutions to lend profitably to the poor and record 
usually high loan recovery rates while fostering growth in the real net worth of the 
borrowers.  Morduch (1999) examines some important mechanisms used by 
microfinance institutions by comparing institutions diverse in the type of models used 
and the target groups.  The study largely features the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 
Bancosol of Bolivia, Bank Rakyat of Indonesia, Kredit Desa of Indonesia and the 
FINCA village banks throughout Indonesia and Latin America, thus drawing on a 
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diverse set of microfinance institutions both geographically and operationally.  Morduch 
identifies five key mechanisms used by these institutions to achieve high repayment 
rates, namely, peer selection, peer monitoring, progressive lending, regular repayment 
schedules and the use of collateral substitutes.  
Peer selection and peer monitoring result from the use of group lending contracts 
which entail joint liability for loans by the borrowers, thus giving an incentive for self-
sorting among the borrowers as they try to avoid partnering with risky borrowers.  This, 
in a sense, shifts some of the monitoring burden to the borrowers themselves and can 
actually help the lender minimize the adverse selection effect resulting from asymmetric 
information.  It is also one way of ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use 
of funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  On 
the other hand, other studies (Madajewicz 2003) have found that this assortative 
matching effect of group lending contracts only works with the poorer borrowers and 
does not hold for the wealthier among the poor.  Nevertheless, group lending has been 
used even in developed nations such as the United States, though at a smaller scale 
(Prescott 1997).  
The third mechanism, progressive lending, refers to a lending and information 
generation mechanism in which the lender starts with very small loans and gradually 
increases the loan size as customers demonstrate reliability (Armendáriz and Morduch 
2005).   Morduch (1999) finds that through the repeated nature of the interactions with 
borrowers and the threat to cut off lending when loans are not repaid, progressive 
lending can be exploited by microfinance institutions as a mechanism for securing high 
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repayment rates.  The incentives are enhanced further if borrowers can anticipate the 
stream of increasingly larger loans.  
The fourth contractual mechanism identified in Morduch’s research is the use of 
frequent regular loan repayment schedules, such as weekly repayments, a mechanism 
used by many microfinance institutions to give an early warning of problem borrowers 
so that lenders can remedy the situation before it worsens.   
Finally the use of various forms of collateral substitutes, including group tax and 
“forced savings” which borrowers cannot withdraw until after a specified period, 
provide alternative forms of demonstrating financial commitment, replacing the 
conventional collateral required by banks. 
In summary, the literature on the economics of borrowing and the development 
of microfinance indicates the potential benefits of credit markets for consumers, as well 
as the limitations on markets.  When borrowers are poor and could gain significant 
utility from the consumption opportunities, their lack of collateral may lead to interest 
rates that make borrowing unaffordable, and more risky from the lenders’ point of view.  
The next section examines the literature from developed country credit markets, with a 
focus on lending to the agriculture sector.  The goal is to understand the supply side of 
credit markets. 
Costs and Returns of Credit Delivery 
A clear understanding of the factors that influence the costs and returns of agricultural 
credit should result in efficient credit delivery, thereby reducing the cost of credit for 
agricultural producers.  This information can be used by agricultural lenders to set 
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interest rates, establish loan fees, price financial services, and develop new methods to 
efficiently supply credit to all types of borrowers (Gloy, Gunderson and LaDue 2005).  
Gloy et al (2005), using borrower-level data from 963 agricultural lending relationships 
at commercial banks and farm credit associations in the northeastern United States, 
examined how lender-borrower relationships, credit risk, and loan contract factors 
influence the costs and returns of extending agricultural credit.  They found that loan 
volume, credit risk, contract characteristics, and relationship characteristics all 
significantly influence how lenders price credit.  They found, for example, that interest 
rate margin decreases as loan volume reaches approximately $3.6 million.  To account 
for this curvature in the interest rate margin function, their model used a quadratic 
specification of interest rate margin.  Their results also show that other things being 
equal, the largest borrowers have access to credit at more favorable rates than their small 
peers until a threshold volume at which lenders are unwilling to discount rates is 
reached.  This result indicates that economies of size in credit delivery are exhausted or 
reversed at the threshold volume. 
Gloy et al also found a positive relationship between the length of the lender-
borrower relationship and interest rate margin.  That is, the longer the lender maintained 
a lending relationship with a borrower, the greater the interest rate margin paid.  For 
example, an increase of ten years resulted in a thirteen basis points (thirteen hundredths 
of a percentage point) increase in interest rate margin.  They attributed this result to a 
possibility that borrowers with longer relationships did not make rate comparisons that 
encourage lenders to lower interest rate margin as the financial situation of the borrower 
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improves. It could also mean that the borrower is staying with the lender of last resort.  
They further found that lenders tended to price loan volume much more aggressively 
than decline in servicing costs would support.  Although lenders experienced average 
cost savings by extending larger loans, the estimated cost decline were less than the 
estimated decline in interest rate margin.  Overall, they found that loan volume had little 
impact on the lender’s profitability per dollar of average loan balance. 
The value of these studies in credit delivery is in understanding the price and 
non-price factors important in credit in U.S. agriculture.  This line of research is possible 
when detailed data from lenders is available and involves advanced econometric 
modeling. 
Assessment of the Financial Condition of a Lender 
Literature on assessing the financial condition of a lender is extensive.  Much of it has 
been developed for regulatory questions.  However, the approaches used can be applied 
by ZATAC managers and potential donors to understand the sustainability of ZATAC as 
a whole.  As ZATAC uses a two-tier model in which the prime lender (ZATAC) lends to 
smallholder cooperatives who in turn lend to their members, the assessment of the 
financial condition of the co-operatives is of importance to ZATAC.  Hirtle and Lopez 
(1999) examined the time decay characteristics of the quality of bank examination 
information available to bank supervisors.  Defining the quality of information as how 
accurately the information from prior examinations reflects the current conditions of a 
bank, Hirtle and Lopez’s study focused on banks’ CAMEL ratings, as a proxy for the 
information resulting from bank examinations.  CAMEL ratings are numerical ratings of 
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the quality of a bank’s financial condition, risk profile, and overall performance, 
assigned by bank examiners – such as the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve, and state 
banking supervisors in the U.S. – at the conclusion of an examination.  The acronym 
CAMEL refers to the five components of a bank’s condition assessed by the regulators: 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. Each component 
is assigned a rating on a 1 to 5 scale, which are then used to assign a composite rating, 
also on a 1 to 5 scale, for the overall condition and performance of the bank.  CAMEL 
ratings of 1 or 2 indicate good performance, while 3, 4, or 5 ratings respectively indicate 
conditions of increasing concern to bank supervisors. 
The rate of decay of on-site bank examination information determines the 
frequency with which bank supervisors have to examine banks to prevent high loan 
losses and bank failures.  Hirtle and Lopez’s study is motivated by the trade-offs that 
must be made between the benefits and costs of more frequent examinations.  Using 
ordered logit regression procedures, with the CAMEL rating as a limited dependent 
variable, and income factors, balance sheet factors, binaries for time, district, and the 
examining agency, as explanatory variables, they set up two models to predict banks’ 
CAMEL ratings.  The two models – one, an on-site model using private supervisory 
information available only to bank supervisors, and the other, an off-site model using 
publicly available information about the bank – are then used to determine the rate of 
decay of on-site examination information.  The logarithmic scoring rule (LSR) technique 
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is used to examine this rate of informational time decay.  The mathematical 
representation of the LSR is 
(11)    
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where N is the number of banks for which forecasts are made, and Pn is a (5x1) vector 
representing an out-of-sample probability forecast in which the ith element represents the 
forecasted probability of the CAMEL rating being in state i.  Rin is an indicator vector 
such that if the CAMEL rating is i (where i = 1,…,5), then the ith element equals one and 
zero otherwise.  For example, the out-of-state forecast for bank n might be Pn = [0; 0.1; 
0.7; 0.2; 0], implying that bank n has 0.1, 0.7, and 0.2 probabilities of receiving CAMEL 
ratings of 2, 3, and 4 respectively, and zero probabilities of receiving 1 or 5 ratings.  If 
the bank receives a CAMEL rating of 3, then Rn = [0; 0; 1; 0; 0].  A higher LSR value 
indicates a better model for predicting the actual bank ratings.  The LSR ranking permits 
comparisons of the on-site examination and off-site models, to determine how long on-
site model information helps to predict the actual condition of a bank better than off-site 
information, and therefore the frequency of bank examinations.  The null hypothesis for 
the LSR, can generally be represented as proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995; cited 
in Hirtle and Lopez, 1999) as 
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If the observed difference, dn, in LRS values between models A and B is statistically 
different from zero, then the observed performance ranking is statistically significant. 
The mathematical representation for the off-site model and on-site or 
examination model are given by equations 14 and 15 respectively. 
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where yi is the current CAMEL rating for bank i; γ is the vector of independent variables 
xi listed in table 1 (except for the indicator variables for the time since the last 
examination); the I(lag)ij’s are the indicator variables corresponding to the time since the 
last examination for bank I; lagCAMELi is the lagged CAMEL rating for bank I from 
the previous examination; the βj’s and θj’s are the corresponding coefficients for the off-
site and examination models, respectively; and εi is the error term. 
The methods used by Hirtle and Lopez can be used to generate a predictive 
model of the cooperative/lenders’ status whose goal is to control the cost of monitoring.  
For ZATAC, since there is not much publicly available information on the condition of 
the cooperative/lenders, there is reliance on on-site examinations.  This cost may be 
high, and a credit risk rating system, coupled with models to predict the informational 
time decay characteristics of the ratings and the probabilities of rating changes, would 
enable ZATAC to reduce monitoring costs.  Reduced monitoring costs can translate into 
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increased profitability and the ability of the lender to offer lower interest rates to 
borrowers. 
 
Table 1. Explanatory Variables Used in the Empirical Models for Predicting 
Banks’ CAMEL Ratings 
Component Explanatory Variables 
Capital Adequacy • equity-to-capital ratio 
• four-quarter change in equity-to-capital ratio 
 
Asset Quality 
 
• log of total assets 
• four-quarter change in log of total assets 
• loan-to-asset ratio 
• commercial and industrial loans as share of total loans 
• one-to-four family mortgages as share of total loans 
• real estate loans as share of total loans 
• consumer loans as share of total loans 
• loans past due thirty to eighty-nine days as share of total assets 
• loans past due ninety days or more as share of total assets 
• non-performing loans as share of loan loss reserves 
• loan loss reserves as share of total loans 
• net charge-offs in year before examination as share of total assets 
• year-over-year change in net charge-offs as share of total assets 
• provisions in year before examination as share of total assets 
• year-over-year provisions as share of total assets 
 
Management 
 
• interest rate risk exposure (assets minus liabilities that mature or reprice in more 
than five years) 
• insider loans as share of total assets 
 
Earnings 
 
• ratio of net income to total assets in year before examination 
• net-income-to-assets ratio lagged one year 
 
Liquidity 
 
• cash as share of total assets 
 
Other Variables 
 
• dummy variables for quarter in which examination took place (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) 
• dummy variables for bank’s Federal Reserve District 
• dummy variables for agency conducting examination (Fed, FDIC, OCC, or state 
regulator) 
• dummy variable for number of quarters since last examination 
Source: Hirtle and Lopez (1999) 
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The next chapter discusses the financial environment in the lender’s credit 
market and access to credit by smallholders in this market.  A description of the lender’s 
microfinance model is also given in this chapter, describing the data used in the study in 
the subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND ACCESS TO CREDIT IN ZAMBIA 
 
Zambia is a landlocked Southern African country with a land area of 752,600 square 
kilometers (290,580 square miles) and a population of 12 million.  About 51% of the 
population lives in urban areas.  A large proportion of the population (64%) lives on less 
than $1 a day.  Access to credit for the smallholder agriculture is limited.  When it is 
available, it is mostly from microfinance institutions, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and commercial outgrower schemes operated by large agribusiness companies.  
In many cases the credit is in form of production inputs rather than cash, at least for the 
latter two sources.  The government has a Fertilizer Support Program – a 50% subsidy 
program in which fertilizer and seed are provided to small scale farmers for a 1 hectare 
maize production.  This program is managed through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) 
and benefits members of registered agricultural cooperatives.  The subsidy program has 
benefited an annual average of 127,500 farmers since 2002 when it was introduced 
(Food Security Research Project 2006).  It is evident, considering the more than one 
million small-scale farmers in the country, that there are still a large number of farmers 
who do not access these subsidies.  
The banking industry in Zambia is composed of the Bank of Zambia and thirteen 
commercial banks.  The Bank of Zambia is the central bank responsible for overall 
regulation of the banking industry and for setting national monetary policy, and thirteen 
commercial banks.  The commercial sector includes eight foreign owned (including one 
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that was recently privatized by the Zambian government); four owned by local private 
investors, and one jointly owned by the Zambian Government and the Indian 
Government (Bank of Zambia 2007).  Non-bank Financial Institutions (NFIs) include 
one development bank, one savings and credit bank, three building societies (mortgage 
companies), three micro-finance institutions and nine leasing companies.  NFIs are 
regulated and supervised by the Bank of Zambia under the Banking and Financial 
Services Act of 2000.  There is one exchange – the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) – 
established as a modern securities exchange in 1993 as part of the government’s 
economic reform program aimed at developing the financial and capital market in order 
to enhance private sector investment (Bank of Zambia 2007).  
As earlier described, despite the existence of these financial institutions, 
agricultural businesses have limited access to credit.   More than 90% of rural farmers in 
Zambia hold no title deeds to their farming land.  Consequently the average Zambian 
farmer has little or no access to loanable funds for commercial farming, as the major 
lending institutions are generally unwilling to extend loans for investment on land 
without title.  Furthermore, without title deeds, the farmers are unable to use their land as 
collateral for agricultural credit.  Given this scenario, microfinance institutions serve an 
important role of enhancing smallholder producers’ access to investment and working 
capital financing.  
There are outgrower schemes which provide small agricultural loans especially 
for cotton, paprika, fresh vegetable and tobacco production.  An outgrower scheme is a 
contract farming scheme involving the lender providing inputs such as seed, chemicals 
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or equipment, to small-scale farmers with a contract that requires the borrower to sell all 
the produce to the lender.  Since the lender’s core business is processing and marketing 
of the financed crop, the lender gains in two ways from the transaction.  First, they are 
able to assure supply availability for the financed crop or its by-products to their own 
buyers.  Second, they can generate real gains from the interest and service fees generated 
from the outgrower lending operation.  The outgrower scheme owners also have the ease 
of recovering the loans from the farmers’ crop sales and pay only the balance above the 
principal and interest, to the extent that side-selling can be prevented.  The farmers on 
the other hand can reap the benefits of having a contracted market for the crops produced 
under the outgrower scheme.  One major problem with these schemes is that they are 
unregulated in Zambia. As a result, small scale farmers are vulnerable to exploitation on 
interest and fee charges by the outgrower scheme operators.  Small-scale farmers that are 
desperately in need of financing for their crop production may also accept contract crop 
prices much less than the forecasted prices of the commodity. 
Since the early 1960s, government-initiated credit programs were undertaken, all 
of which failed, some after recording short-lived successes.  Other programs stayed 
longer possibly only due to government subsidies.  As these subsidized programs 
weighed down heavily on the government, they could not be sustained for long.  There is 
not much research available aimed at understanding the particular characteristics that led 
to the failure of all the government credit programs.  Copestake (1998) describes the 
Agricultural Credit Management Program (ACMP) that was launched by the 
government in 1994 with the goal of promoting a private sector network for delivery of 
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credit in line with the government policy to de-subsidize credit.  Copestake concludes 
that despite being consistent with the credit de-subsidization commitment, the ACMP 
was not effective in promoting business development, largely because the lending 
institutions still viewed agricultural lending as unprofitable and risky and therefore did 
not support it.  
In another study that relates more to the commercial banking system, Maimbo 
(2002) finds that the Zambian central bank’s model to detect deterioration of credit was 
adequate, however, many managerial and financial, i.e. credit, risks remained in the 
banking system.  While the conclusions of Maimbo relate to commercial banking, the 
importance of capital management ability and lender-borrower interactions are 
generalizable to all lenders.  
Demand for loanable funds by small-scale farmers is high in Zambia, and 
currently unmet by the existing lending institutions providing credit to this category of 
borrowers.  Some microfinance institutions concentrate on consumer credit and are 
therefore inaccessible for agricultural production purposes.  Most outgrower schemes are 
also operated as short term projects by donor funded non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  Although a good source of small credit, the short-term nature of these schemes 
has been a limiting factor.  Moreover, the loans, averaging less than $600, are often too 
small to enhance meaningful investments in agricultural production, agro-processing and 
related projects. 
The ZATAC project – a smallholder agriculture commercialization project – was 
established in Zambia, with USAID funding, by Development Alternatives, Inc. in 1999.  
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Following the successful commercialization of the smallholder dairy sub sector in the 
southern province through the establishment of milk collection centers and support 
systems by the project, a private non-profit company was incorporated in 2002 to ensure 
sustainability, improvement and replication of the smallholder commercialization model.  
The company became known as ZATAC Limited.  The company offers agribusiness 
project management services, market development and market linkages, organizational 
training for new and existing smallholder cooperatives, business development services, 
and credit through the ZATAC Investment Fund (ZIF) – the company’s lending facility. 
The ZATAC Smallholder Model 
The ZATAC Investment Fund (ZIF) was established with the strategic aim of helping to 
commercialize smallholder production through increased access to credit.  In August 
2004, the ZIF had a small loan portfolio of about $320,000.  Since then, the ZIF has 
attracted a number of funding agencies that have channeled loan funds for specific 
development financing needs through it.  As of March 2007, ZIF had a total loan balance 
of about $2.9 million. Of this portfolio, 59% was in loans to large agribusinesses (mainly 
agro-processors and exporters that provide a primary market to the smallholder producer 
groups).  The other 41% (that is, $1.20 million was in direct loans to small-scale 
producers organized in cooperatives and other small to medium agribusinesses.  The 
microfinance portfolio to smallholder cooperatives alone as of that date was about 27% 
($970,000).  About 64% of the loans to the cooperatives were short- and medium-term 
loans that were further loaned by the cooperatives to their individual members, usually 
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25 – 30 members per cooperative.  The remaining 36% was long term infrastructure 
development loans, such as buildings and equipment loans. 
The ZATAC technical approach for commercializing smallholder production 
involves five phases.  The first phase involves evaluating the commercial potential for 
smallholder production to help smallholders transition from subsistence production to 
cash-earning production and value-addition to maximize returns to labor and investment.  
The second phase involves identifying and mobilizing producer communities resulting in 
the development/strengthening of formal business groups and cooperatives.  Phase three 
involves the training of producer groups/cooperative members, usually provided in three 
tracks: (a) technical skills focusing on animal husbandry, crop production, quality 
control, (b) business and management skills, including farm budgeting, book-keeping, 
financial management, markets and marketing, and (c) organizational 
development/cooperative governance to help raise collective consciousness by pooling 
resources and building solidarity.  In phase four, credit is provided to the smallholder 
producers through their cooperatives.  The loans are in three forms: (a) short term (3 – 6 
month) working capital, trade finance and seasonal loans; (b) medium term (1 – 3 year) 
loans usually for capital investments, such as purchase of dairy cows; and (c) long term 
(3 – 10 year) loans mainly for plant and equipment.  Phase four is accomplished through 
the ZATAC Investment Fund.  The final phase, which runs concurrently with phases one 
through four, involves building long term relationships between ZATAC and the 
smallholder producer institutions. 
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ZATAC lends to rural small-scale producers in organized groups, usually 
cooperatives and to registered agribusiness companies, especially those that provide 
markets for rural small-scale farmers.  ZATAC does not provide consumer loans.  No 
loans are provided to individuals without a specific viable business plan. Table 2 below 
provides a summary of the ZATAC lending criteria and loan terms. 
 
Table 2. ZATAC Typical Loan Terms 
Criteria Applicable Terms 
Interest Rates LIBOR1 rate plus 4% margin on dollar-denominated loans. 
Prevailing inflation rate2 (adjusted bi-annually) plus 2 - 3% margin for 
Kwacha-denominated loans.  
Service/Facility Fees3 3.5% on dollar-denominated loans. 
5% on Kwacha-denominated loans. 
Loan Term 3 – 6 months: working capital, trade finance, seasonal loans. 
1 – 3 years: medium term capital loans (e.g. dairy restocking). 
3 – 10 years: long-term investment loans (plant and equipment). 
Repayment schedule Variable (ranging from monthly to lump-sum payable at maturity). 
Collateral Variable (usually does not require collateral from rural groups). 
Group lending Joint liability through cooperatives (rural and peri-urban), which in turn lend 
to individual members. 
1As of March 2007, 6-month dollar LIBOR rate was about 5.32%. 
2As of March 2007, inflation rate was 15.9%. 
3Facility fees are paid up front before loans are disbursed. Cooperatives pay service fees calculated in the 
same way as interest and these are not paid in advance. 
 
 
Comparison of ZATAC Smallholder Model with Other Microfinance Institutions 
Table 3 shows comparisons of the ZATAC smallholder program with other microfinance 
institutions around the world.  The comparisons are based on Morduch’s synthesis of 
key contract mechanisms employed by the major microfinance institutions he surveyed 
(Morduch 1999).  The ZATAC smallholder data was collected from the ZATAC office. 
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Peer selection and peer monitoring were combined into one mechanism, group 
lending, since the initial two mechanisms may not be easily observable in the wake of 
information asymmetries. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of the ZATAC Smallholder Program with Other 
Microfinance Programs 
 ZATAC, 
Zambia 
Grameen 
Bank, 
Bangladesh 
Banco-
Sol, 
Bolivia 
Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, Unit 
Desa 
Badan 
Credit 
Desa, 
Indonesia 
FINCA 
Village 
banks 
Membership 655 in 22 
coops1. 
2.4 million 8,503 2 million 
borrowers, 16 
million depositors 
765, 586 89,986 
Average loan 
balance 
$1,624 for 
coop 
members 
$134 $909 $1007 $71 $191 
Typical loan 
term 
3 months – 
10 years 
1 year 4-12 
months 
3-24 months 3 months 4 months 
Percent female 
members 
26% 95% 61%  –  23% 95% 
Mostly rural? 
Urban? 
Mostly rural Rural Urban Mostly rural Rural Mostly 
rural 
Group lending 
contracts? 
Both group 
& individual 
Yes Yes No No No 
Collateral 
required? 
Yes, except 
for coops 
No No Yes No No 
Voluntary 
savings 
emphasized? 
Yes, in their 
own bank 
accounts 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Progressive 
lending? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regular 
repayments? 
Flexible Weekly Flexible Flexible Flexible Weekly 
Target clients 
for lending? 
Largely poor Poor Largely 
non-poor 
Non-poor Poor Poor 
Currently 
financially 
sustainable? 
No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Nominal 
interest rates 
8 – 20% 20% 47.5 – 
50.5% 
32 – 43% 55% 36 – 48% 
Annual 
consumer price 
inflation 
13.5% 2.7% 12.4% 8.0% 8.0%  – 
Real interest 
rate 
5.4% 17.3% 35.1 – 
38.1% 
24 – 31% 47%  – 
1 ZATAC is not membership based; the figure shows the number of cooperative members borrowing through  
   their respective cooperatives. 
Source: Morduch, 1999; except ZATAC figures which are based on data from ZIF office. 
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The comparisons reveal that there are common features employed by these 
institutions. The common features include: 
1. Group lending: ZATAC uses group lending by offering credit to rural small-scale 
agricultural producers through cooperatives.  The members of a cooperative are 
held to a joint liability contract signed with ZATAC through the cooperative, 
thus conferring the benefits of peer monitoring to the lender.  An adaptation of 
group lending here is that ZATAC requires that each cooperative signs additional 
sub-loan contracts with their respective members, which give the cooperative 
monitoring power and authority to impose stiff sanctions or completely cut off 
defaulting borrowers.  A further adaptation made by ZATAC to the peer 
selection process of group lending is that ZATAC’s loan officers assess the 
credibility of each cooperative’s selection process by visiting all selected 
members, focusing on their potential to profitably produce the commodity chosen 
and any characteristics that could affect their ability to do so.  The results of 
these assessments are shared with all members of the cooperative, who may then 
take into account these findings in selecting loan recipients. 
2. Use of collateral substitutes for cooperatives: Like many microfinance 
institutions, ZATAC does not usually require explicit collateral from 
cooperatives for the funds destined to be lent to individual cooperative members.  
However, ZATAC holds liens on any plant and equipment and dairy animals 
purchased through its loan funds.  In addition, ZATAC requires that all 
equipment and dairy animals purchased through its loan funds be insured.  Due 
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to the cost of insurance, however, ZATAC does not usually emphasize insurance 
of buildings.  Emphasis on pre-contracted markets for the agricultural produce 
before disbursement of loans to cooperatives also provides some form of 
insurance allowing for the easing of collateral requirements.  ZATAC itself gets 
actively involved in assisting the cooperatives to strike good commodity market 
deals. 
3. Progressive lending: The business development section of ZATAC works with 
the ZATAC Investment Fund (ZIF) to develop long term relationships with 
borrower cooperatives.  Better performing cooperatives with good repayment 
rates have the promise of receiving further loans.  Subsequent loans are not 
necessarily larger than the first loan due to the high cost of initial investments 
required for agricultural production and processing projects.  Nevertheless the 
continued loans are often necessary in the early years of these projects for 
sustainability of operations and in later years for business expansion.  Evidence 
of this is the number of multi-loan borrowers in the ZATAC loan portfolio.  
More than half of all borrowers had more than one loan. 
Differences also exist between the ZATAC model and other microfinance institutions. 
These include: 
1. Lower real interest rates: A significant difference between ZATAC and the other 
microfinance institutions analyzed is that the former offers much lower annual 
real interest rates, ranging between 5% and 9% compared to a 17.3 – 47% range 
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for the other institutions. This may imply that ZATAC manages the risk with 
other mechanisms than interest rates. 
2. Larger loans provided by ZATAC: The size of the loans provided by ZATAC is 
significantly larger than those provided by comparable microfinance institutions.  
This can be explained by the high investment costs required for agricultural 
investments to be profitable. 
3. ZATAC is very small: Compared to the other institutions analyzed in the 
published literature, ZATAC is much smaller.  Partly, the current size is a 
reflection of the short period ZATAC has been in operation given the initial 
startup capital that it had.  The smaller number of borrowers also enables 
ZATAC to easily monitor the borrowers and reduce the risk of default. 
4. No deposits: Unlike all other microfinance institutions analyzed, ZATAC does 
not take deposits.  ZATAC therefore does not use ‘forced’ deposits mechanisms 
sometimes employed by other microfinance institutions to improve repayment 
rates.  Borrower cooperatives are, however, required to maintain loan repayment 
accounts with a commercial bank with which ZATAC has a fund management 
agreement for purposes of monitoring loan repayment activity. 
5. Automatic repayments tied to production: This is a mechanism extensively 
exploited by ZATAC to improve repayments that is not used by other 
microfinance institutions.  Cooperative members are required to sell all 
contracted produce through the cooperative marketing centers.  The cooperatives 
then deduct loan repayments from the sales of each member, based on 
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production, and directly pay to ZATAC.  By publicly displaying charts of both 
production and loan repayment trends of each member, the cooperative creates a 
system of peer monitoring which improves production and loan repayments 
through social pressure.  The cooperative leadership can also quickly detect 
defaulting members and take corrective action as members in good standing try 
to avoid bearing defaulting members’ loan liability.  Because payments of sales 
are made to the members monthly by the cooperative, members have a ‘banking’ 
system within their cooperatives and the lump-sum payments enable them to 
invest in other businesses or expand their current businesses. 
6. Loans disbursed: Often ZATAC disburses loans in the form of building, 
equipment and inputs to small-scale farmer cooperatives, based on the 
cooperatives’ project proposals.  This ensures borrowed funds are invested in the 
intended projects.  Loans for a dairy project by a cooperative, for instance, will 
take the form of direct payments to building contractors, equipment suppliers and 
dairy cow suppliers and/or insurance companies. 
7. Cooperative sanctions on members: Cooperatives repossess dairy animals and 
equipment from members who side-sell their milk.  Cooperative sanctions are 
also administered by cooperatives involved in other production projects such as 
coffee, fresh vegetables, fish farming and honey. 
8. Organizational and business development services: ZATAC has a developmental 
focus, often helping build the organizational and leadership capacity of new 
borrower cooperatives even before the loans are disbursed.  Training is given to 
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all cooperative members to build collective consciousness among members 
towards resource pooling and collective marketing in order take advantage of 
economies of scale and lower transaction costs.  Identification of new business 
opportunities for investment by the cooperatives is an integral part of the 
ZATAC model for smallholder commercialization and dynamic incentives 
formulation.  Business and technical skills training are also given to members of 
borrower cooperatives.  Technical skills include production, quality control and 
quality assurance systems while business skills range from basic bookkeeping, 
farm budgeting, markets/marketing to financial management. 
9. Loans to large agribusiness companies: ZATAC provides a substantial portion of 
loan funds to larger and more established agribusinesses, especially agro-
processors and exporters, who provide markets and sometimes other additional 
services to smallholder cooperatives.  Common uses of such loan funds by the 
agribusinesses include commodity purchases for processing, export transaction 
costs and other trade finance requirements.  This way, new and growing 
cooperatives can tap into the capacity of the larger agribusinesses to process and 
add-value and get market guarantees for their produce. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
From its origin as an outgrowth of a development project in 1999, ZATAC Limited has 
progressed rapidly in serving the credit needs of the agricultural borrowers in the 
Zambian market.  As a non-profit company, one of its main objectives is sustainability 
while meeting development needs. 
The description of ZATAC’s activities in the previous chapter demonstrates 
more differences than similarities to the microfinance institutions studied in the 
development literature.  The distinctions are not unexpected given the mission and 
clientele ZATAC serves in commercializing agribusiness.  The similarities discussed in 
this study demonstrate that the approach of joint liability and community pressures have 
extended from consumer lending into the agricultural credit sector in Zambia.  It is too 
early to determine whether these features of ZATAC’s programs have contributed 
positively to its performance in terms of repayment.  The ZATAC Investment Fund is 
just completing its start-up phase, increasing loans by over six times between 2004 and 
early 2007.  The economic and business factors associated with ZATAC’s supply of 
credit will be described in a quantitative model in the subsequent chapters.  This chapter 
contains a description of the ZATAC loan portfolio and analysis by firms, followed by a 
chapter on results from the regression analysis. 
The loan data used in the study were collected from ZATAC Limited, a Zambian 
company with a specialized smallholder agribusiness lending program.  ZATAC is one 
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of several nongovernmental organizations operating in the Zambian agricultural market.  
However, ZATAC is the only entity with a separate investment fund that serves as an 
ongoing source of funds to smallholder agribusinesses in Zambia.  The company is a 
significant player in the commercialization of smallholder production in Zambia. 
ZATAC lends to both smallholder agricultural cooperatives and investor owned 
agribusinesses that provide a market to smallholder producers for their commodities. 
The ZATAC loan portfolio totaled $2.908 million as at March 2007, lent over a 
three-year period.  The ZATAC investment fund had other funds set aside for further 
lending to smallholder producers.  The data collected consists of the full portfolio of 
loans already disbursed, which included sixty one (61) individual loans disbursed to 
thirty (30) borrowers.  Some borrowers had multiple loans.  Table 4 shows the 
distribution of borrowers with multiple loans.  ZATAC’s use of progressive lending, as 
commonly done in microfinance, is evident in the multiple loans borrowed by its clients.  
More than half of the thirty firms accessed credit from ZATAC more than once. 
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Table 4. ZATAC Borrowers with Multiple Loans* 
Borrower ID Name Number of Loans 
CHE Cheetah Zambia Limited 4 
CHI Chinjara Dairy Cooperative 4 
MBA Mbala Agricultural Cooperative 4 
MPK Mpika Livestock Cooperative 4 
KAZ Kazungula Agricultural Cooperative 3 
LKM LKM Investments Limited 3 
MBB Mbabala Multi-purpose Cooperative Society 3 
MPI Mpima Cooperative Society 3 
MUN Munchi Cooperative Society 3 
ZIM Zimba Dairy Cooperative 3 
ANT Antomwe Dairy Cooperative 2 
BAT Batoka Goat Marketing Centre 2 
FRE Freshpikt Limited 2 
KAB Kabwe Tannery Limited 2 
LAC LACCU Agricultural Cooperative 2 
NYA Nyamphande Agricultural Cooperative 2 
ZEO ZEOCO Spices and Oils Limited 2 
*Note: thirteen of the thirty firms have one loan.  Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
Smallholder cooperative borrowers make up the microfinance component of the lender’s 
total loan portfolio.  Cooperatives do not have collateral to secure the loans, so ZATAC 
employs microfinance mechanisms such as joint liability lending and automatic 
repayments tied to production when lending to this category of borrowers.  Joint liability 
contracts entail that when a group member defaults on their payment, the group will pay 
the loan for the member.  Automatic repayments tied to production requires that all 
members of a cooperative market their produce jointly through the cooperative, which 
then deducts loan repayments from each members sales to pay the lender.  The 
cooperatives extend the loans to their members on the same terms of interest rates, fees, 
repayment amounts, and loan length as the primary loan contract.  On the other hand, 
agribusinesses can provide sufficient collateral to secure their own loans and the 
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microfinance loan contract mechanisms do not apply to these borrowers.  The data set 
used in the study does not include individual cooperative member loan records.  A loan 
to several cooperative members through their cooperative is therefore treated as a single 
loan. 
Although not all loans in the portfolio were on schedule in repayment, none were 
in default, and the portfolio had no debt write-offs over the lending period January 2005 
to March 2007.  The data collected included loan repayment data.  However, the lending 
period was too short with no significant variation in repayments on the loans to permit a 
robust analysis of loan performance characteristics.  This restricted our analysis to 
factors affecting supply of credit from the lender. 
ZATAC loans cover a number of agricultural sub-sectors.  Table 5 gives the 
industry representation of loans.  Dairy and spices accounted for nearly 60% of all loans 
disbursed.  Although these categories accounted for 43% and 16% of the total number of 
loans, respectively, spices accounted for more than half of the total loan value.  Loan 
records showed that most of the spice/paprika loans were large, short-term trade finance 
loans to established agribusiness firms.  The agribusinesses buy the spices/paprika from 
the smallholder producers under outgrower schemes and thus provide a market to the 
smallholder farmers.  Contracted production provides an important benefit to 
smallholder producers by reducing price and income risk in their production.  As 
agricultural commodity prices often vary significantly within an agricultural season, the 
risk reduction effect of contracted production is of importance to both producers and 
lenders.  Lenders are hypothesized to be more likely to supply credit to producers with 
 44
market contracts than those without.  This study analyzes this question using a binary 
variable for contracted market.  That is, we define a market variable, MKT, such that its 
value is 1 when the borrower has a contract market for the financed production at the 
time of borrowing, and 0 when the borrower does not.  This enables us to analyze the 
average effect compared with credit to firms without contracts. 
 
Table 5. Industry Representation of ZATAC Loans 
Loan Value  ($) Industry Number 
of 
Loans 
% of Total 
No. of 
Loans Total for 
Industry
Average 
% of Total 
Portfolio 
Spices/Paprika 10 16% $ 1,610,156 $ 161,016 55% 
Dairy 26 43% $ 603,536  $ 23,213 21% 
Beans 1 2% $ 200,000 $ 200,000 7% 
Fish 3 5% $ 76,739 $ 25,280 3% 
Soybean 1 2% $ 71,000 $ 71,000 2% 
Hogs/Pigs 3 5% $ 58,443 $ 19,481 2% 
Goats 4 7% $ 44,020 $ 11,005 1% 
Leather/Hides 2 3% $ 41,720 $ 20,860 1% 
Poultry 3 5% $ 25,852 $ 11,845 1% 
Cotton/Textile 2 3% $ 20,238 $ 10,119 1% 
Rice 1 2% $ 20,000 $ 20,000 1% 
Other* 5 8% $ 126,135 $ 22,001 4% 
 Total 61 100% $ 2,907,522 $ 47,664 100% 
   *Includes cucumbers, mushrooms, molasses, and honey. Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
ZATAC loans were disbursed in either the local currency or in US dollars.  Most 
borrowers whose products were sold in the export markets preferred to borrow in 
dollars, the currency in which payment for their products are made.  Table 6 and figure 6 
show the lender’s loan portfolio distribution by currency, with local currency loans 
converted to dollar terms for comparison purposes.  The Kwacha loans were converted 
to their dollar equivalents using a conversion factor of $1: ZMK 4,056.05.  The 
 45
exchange rate used represents the average Dollar-Kwacha exchange rate in the lending 
period, January 2005 to March 2007 (Bank of Zambia).  The average loan balance on the 
US dollar loans was $121,284 with a standard deviation of $91,342.  The corresponding 
mean and standard deviation for the local currency loans were $21,506 and $19,229 
respectively. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of ZATAC Loans by Currency of Disbursement 
Currency No. of Loans Total Amount ($) Average Loan 
Balance ($) 
Std Deviation 
($)
US Dollar Loans 16 $ 1,939,746 $ 121,284 $ 91,342
ZM Kwacha 
Loans 
45 $ 967,777 $ 21,506 $ 19,229
Total 61             $ 2,907,522 $ 47,664 $ 65,677
 Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
US Dollar Loans
 $1,939,746 
67%
ZM Kw acha Loans
 $967,777 
33%
 
Figure 6. ZATAC Loan Distribution by Currency of Loan Disbursement 
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Pricing of the credit that ZATAC supplies includes interest rates that differ 
according to currency, and fees that vary by borrower type.  Interest rates on local 
currency loans were based on the national inflation rate plus a credit risk margin.  US 
dollar-denominated loans had interest rates based on the prevailing LIBOR rates plus a 
credit risk margin.  ZATAC uses inflation rates published by the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (MoFNP) of Zambia, in the National Economic Report in June and 
December of every year, as the reference for determining interest rates on Kwacha loans.    
Loans are fixed once they are priced. That is, interest rates remain the same on loans 
already issued, except for long-term loans, on which the loan contracts provide for 
revisions in rates up or down based on new published inflation statistics.  To account for 
actual inflation in the economic analysis of credit supply, interest rates on the Kwacha 
loans are adjusted in this study using monthly inflation figures to reflect the real interest 
rates.  The use of real interest rates in the analysis of credit supply is appropriate for the 
lender because this determines the return to the lender of supplying credit to borrowers.  
Monthly inflation data are published by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Zambia, 
which is the source of the inflation data used in the analysis (Central Statistical Office, 
March 2007). 
It is important to note that the inflation rates used by the lender are historic 
inflation rates.  The correct way to price loans would be to use forecasted future inflation 
rates for the lending period and use these in determining the lending rates.  However, 
because the lender uses historic inflation rates, we also make use of historic monthly 
rates published by the Central Statistical Office. Monthly inflation statistics are used 
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rather than the bi-annual inflation figures actually used by ZATAC to get a better 
estimation of real rates due to the high fluctuations in inflation rates.  Table 7 shows the 
inflation and LIBOR rates statistics for the period relevant to this study.  For the 2005 
inflation data, it was necessary in this study to adjust the two sources (MoFNP and CSO) 
so that negative interest rates were ruled out. 
 
Table 7. Annual Inflation and LIBOR Rates Data for the Lending Period  
(January 2005 to March 2007) 
Month Annual Inflation Rate (%) 
LIBOR Rate 
(%) 
January 2005 18.2 3.22 
February 2005 18.7 3.38 
March 2005 17.4 3.68 
April 2005 18.6 3.73 
May 2005 19.1 3.75 
June 2005 19.2 3.81 
July 2005 18.7 4.05 
August 2005 19.3 4.27 
September 2005 19.5 4.21 
October 2005 18.3 4.57 
November 2005 17.2 4.78 
December 2005 15.9 4.84 
January 2006 12.2 4.84 
February 2006 10.3 5.08 
March 2006 10.7 5.14 
April 2006 9.4 5.33 
May 2006 8.6 5.40 
June 2006 8.5 5.60 
July 2006 8.7 5.66 
August 2006 8.0 5.50 
September 2006 8.2 5.38 
October 2006 7.9 5.36 
November 2006 8.1 5.30 
December 2006 8.2 5.22 
January 2007 9.8 5.37 
February 2007 12.6 5.38 
March 2007 12.7 5.20 
     Min. 7.9 3.22 
     Max. 19.5 5.66 
     Mean 13.5 4.74 
     Std. Deviation 4.7 0.75 
          Sources: Central Statistical Office, March 2007; British Banker Association,  
                         March 2007. 
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The real interest rates used on the loans are calculated by subtracting inflation in 
the month in which the loans were disbursed, from the nominal interest rates, as follows: 
tntn ir γ−=,  
where rn,t is the real annual interest rate on Kwacha loan n disbursed in month t, in is the 
nominal interest rate for loan n, and γ t is the year-over-year inflation rate in month t. 
The lender had a loan fee structure that differed slightly for loans to cooperative 
and non-cooperative borrowers.  For investor-owned agribusinesses, borrowers paid loan 
fees prior to disbursement.  In some cases, especially for small to medium 
agribusinesses, loan fees were deducted from the loan amount at disbursement.  
Cooperatives, on the other hand, paid loan fees usually after the loan has been disbursed 
once the borrower starts repaying the loan.  Cooperatives pay fees on the same schedule 
as interest payments.  The lender therefore bears no risk on loan fees from investor 
owned agribusinesses, but carries some risk on fees from cooperatives.  Table 8 gives 
summary statistics for nominal and real interest rates, and ZATAC loan fees for 
individual loans during the lending period. 
 
Table 8. Summary of ZATAC Interest Rates and Loan Fees for Individual Loans 
over the Period January 2005 to March 2007 
 Nominal Interest Rate (%) 
Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
Loan Fees 
(USD) 
Min.   8.0   0.7 $ 1
Max. 22.0 13.1 $ 7,500
Mean 15.9  5.4 $ 1,585
Std. Deviation   4.0  3.8 $ 1,999
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
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The table shows some important differences in loan terms when compared to 
microfinance lenders such as those studied by Morduch (table 3).  Real interest rates are 
significantly lower for ZATAC than for the other microfinance programs, which ranged 
from 17.3 – 47%. 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics of ZATAC loan fees expressed in relation to 
the loan terms, i.e., in US$ per year equivalent. Cooperatives pay loan fees on the same 
schedule as interest rates while agribusinesses pay loan fees up-front. The data have 
therefore been separated into cooperative and agribusiness loan fees per year. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of ZATAC Loan Fees in Relation to Loan Term over 
the Period January 2005 to March 2007 
 
 Loan Term (Years) Equivalent Loan Fees Per Year (USD) 
 Cooperatives Agribusinesses Cooperatives Agribusinesses
Min. 0.25 0.10 $ 1.00 $ 8.16
Max. 9.86 3.00 $ 5,233 $ 7,058
Mean 4.01 0.71 $ 960 $ 1,977
Std. Deviation 4.05 0.92 $ 1,248 $ 2,010
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
The table shows that when loan fees are expressed in dollars per year equivalent, 
agribusinesses pay on average about twice as much fees as cooperatives. On the other 
hand, cooperatives accessed loans with loan terms more than five times longer on 
average than agribusinesses. 
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To analyze the supply of credit from ZATAC to borrowers, aggregated loan data 
at the borrower-level are used.  The purpose of the aggregation is to enable analysis of 
how credit supply is affected by the various firm-specific and economic factors that are 
relevant in the lender’s credit market.  Firm-specific factors that can influence the 
lender’s willingness to supply can not be easily analyzed at the individual loan level.  
Firms that had more than one loan were aggregated into one observation (table 10). 
Aggregation was achieved by summing the dollar amounts borrowed by each firm to 
obtain supply of credit to the firm.  Similarly, the dollar amounts of fees paid by each 
firm were summed to obtain the aggregate loan fee. 
Real interest rate and loan term for the multi-loan observations were created with 
weights for the loan amount.  Thus the real interest rate and term used in the firm-level 
model are given by equations 16 and 17 respectively. 
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where ijn is the interest rate on loan n for firm j, jnϕ is the loan amount for firm j’s nth 
loan, and jnτ  is the loan term on firm j’s nth loan. Table 10 shows the loan data 
aggregated by firm. 
 51
Table 10. Summary of Firm-Level (Aggregated) Loan Amounts, Interest Rates and 
Loan Fees over the Period January 2005 to March 2007 
 
 Loan Amounts 
(USD) 
Nominal Interest Rate 
(%) 
Real Interest 
Rate 
(%) 
Loan Fees (USD) 
Min. $ 1,200   8.5   2.0 $ 1
Max. $ 525,000 22.0 13.1 $ 13,843
Mean $ 96,917 15.4  6.8 $ 3,224
Std. Deviation $ 136,433   4.3  3.6 $ 3,733
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
The loans were issued under three term classifications: short-term (loans with a 
term of up to one year), medium-term (longer than one year, up to three years), and long-
term (longer than three years, up to ten years).  Table 11 and figure 7 show the loan 
portfolio characteristics by loan term.  59% of the total portfolio was in short-term loans, 
while medium- and long-term loans accounted for 23% and 18% respectively.  Short 
term loans made up 69% of the total portfolio value, with an average of $56,193 per 
loan.  Medium and long term loans had averages of $40,580 and $28,768 per loan 
respectively.  The large number of short-term loans compared to medium- and long-term 
loans indicates both export financing and the financing needs of seasonal agricultural 
production.  Both of these activities require financing for relatively short terms.  Export 
financing loans were also comparatively larger in size. 
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Table 11. Distribution of ZATAC Loans by Loan Term 
Loan Value ($) 
Loan Term No. of Loans 
% of Total 
No. of 
Loans Total Average 
% of Total 
Portfolio 
Short-Term 36 59% $2,022,946 $56,193 69% 
Medium-Term 14 23% $568,124 $40,580 20% 
Long-Term 11 18% $316,453 $28,768 11% 
Total 61 100% $2,907,522 $47,664 100% 
  Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
Short Term
 2,022,946 
69%
Medium Term
 568,124 
20%
Long Term
 316,453 
11%
 
Figure 7. Distribution of ZATAC Loans by Loan Term 
 
Most (70%) of the loan value was used for value-added projects rather than 
primary production ($2.039 million).  The remaining 30% ($0.868 million) were for 
primary production activities, including infrastructure investments for primary 
production and minimal processing (table 12). 
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Table 12. Distribution of ZATAC Loans by Type of Project 
Loan Term Primary Production Processing Activities 
Amount ($) $ 868,153 $ 2,039,369 
Percent of Total (%) 30% 70% 
        Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007 
 
There is a wide range of size in the borrowers serviced by the lender.  Small 
agribusinesses and smallholder cooperatives (with assets less than $50,000) made up the 
largest number of individual loans and accounted for one-third of the total loan portfolio 
amount, but also had the lowest average loan balance of $25,000.  Large agribusinesses 
(with assets greater than $250,000) had the largest average loan balance of $150,000 and 
largest share of the total portfolio, accounting for more than half by value.  Medium-
sized agribusinesses (with assets between $50,000 and $250,000) accounted for one-fifth 
of the number of loans and 15% share of the total portfolio value. 
A number of the loans in the portfolio went to women-led firms.  Table 13 shows 
female representation by number and value of the loans.  Although the number of loans 
was small in the medium to large agribusiness category, the loan amounts were quite 
substantial. 29% of the total loan portfolio was accessed by women or women-led agro 
firms.  In the large agribusiness firm group, women-led firms held 35% of the loan 
portfolio.  In the small agribusiness and cooperatives group, which are membership-
based, women represented an average of 30% of membership, and therefore of the total 
number of loans and loan value in this category. 
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Table 13. Loans to Women and Women-Led Firms 
Loan Amount ($ ‘000) Size Category Number of 
Loans to 
Women-led 
Businesses 
Total, all 
Agribusinesses
Women-Led 
Agribusinesses 
Only 
Percent of 
Portfolio 
Value
Large Agribusiness  21 $ 1,500 $ 552 35%
Medium Agribusiness  
   
2 
 
$ 423 $ 24 6%
Small Agribusiness  
and Cooperatives2 
 
13 
 
$ 980
 
$ 294 
 
30%
 
Total 
 
17 
 
$ 2,908
 
$ 846 
 
29%
1 These two loans were made to the same firm. 
2All cooperatives are membership-based and have an average women representation of 30%.            
   Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
Two-thirds of the ZATAC portfolio was to borrowers who had contracted 
markets before applying for credit.  Table 14 shows the distribution of ZATAC loans for 
which the financed production or processing had contracted markets versus those with 
open market arrangements.  The average value of the loans for projects not having a 
contract was comparatively much lower than the contracted projects.  The average loan 
amount for contracted and open market production loans was approximately three to 
one. 
 
Table 14. Distribution of ZATAC Loans by Product Market Contracts 
Loan Amount ($ ‘000)  Number of 
Loans Total Average 
Percent of 
Total 
Portfolio 
Value
Contracted production 26 $ 1,991 $ 77 68%
Open market arrangement 35 $ 916 $ 26 32%
Total 61 $ 2,908  29%
      Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
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The ZATAC loan portfolio data gives evidence of a broad dispersal of loans in 
several agro sectors and significant lending to smallholders.  The limited lending period 
involved, however, makes analysis of many important economic questions infeasible.  
Key economic questions that could be analyzed with more data include loan repayment 
performance and how firm- and loan-specific factors affect credit risk.  The probability 
of default by different categories of borrowers, or the probability of borrowers migrating 
into lower credit score ratings over time could also be analyzed with sufficient 
observations.  Studies by Hirtle (1999) and Maimbo (2002) make similar analyses using 
data from U.S. and Zambian bank regulators respectively. 
Sufficient observations for the ZATAC data would further allow analysis of the 
effects of lender-borrower relationship factors, such as length of lending relationship and 
borrowers’ use of other financial and development-oriented services by the lender, on 
supply of credit. Gloy, Gunderson and LaDue (2005) carried out similar analysis using 
U.S. data. 
Data limitations preclude analyses of the important economic questions discussed 
above and limit this study to the analysis to credit supply.  Nonetheless, a clear 
understanding of how credit supply to agricultural producers is affected by various firm 
and industry factors is in itself as important to lenders and policymakers as it is to the 
borrowers.  This knowledge is critical to the development and growth of more efficient 
smallholder agricultural cooperatives, a goal that the Zambian government has focused 
on recently.  Policymakers can use the information to develop a variety of programs that 
improve credit access for smallholder cooperatives, or encourage microfinance 
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institutions and commercial lenders to increase credit supply to cooperatives.  These 
programs, in turn, may generate lending efficiency gains that lenders can pass to 
smallholder cooperatives in the form of lower interest rates to enable their growth.  
Cooperatives can also use this information to strengthen appropriate structures that 
enhance their access to credit supply, thereby enhancing relationships with their lenders. 
Methodology 
A quantitative model to analyze the supply of credit from ZATAC to smallholder 
cooperatives and investor owned agribusiness firms is developed.  The model is used to 
analyze how credit supply is affected by the various firm-specific factors and other 
economic factors relevant in the lender’s credit market.  The key economic factors are 
real interest rate and loan fees.  Other important factors in the market include loan term, 
availability of contracted markets, and the type of borrowing firm (cooperative or non-
cooperative). 
Real interest rate and loan fees are critical elements of pricing for many lenders.  
These factors determine the return to the lender, of supplying credit to borrowers and 
reflect the risk built into the projects being financed as well as market risk.  The lender’s 
objective is to at least cover the cost of providing the credit, servicing and monitoring 
the borrowers.  The extent to which the lender relies on either interest rate or loan fees to 
cover these costs will differ for different credit markets.  The extent which these two key 
variables will clear the markets will vary depending on prevailing market factors, such 
as access to information by both lenders and borrowers.  In markets with high 
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information asymmetries, studies (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Stiglitz and Weiss 1987) 
have shown that interest rates do not clear the market. 
 Availability of funds for agricultural lending is limited in the lender’s market.  
Specialized agricultural lenders such as ZATAC therefore face a high demand for credit 
from smallholder agricultural producers and processors due to smallholders’ inability to 
access credit from the commercial banking industry.  This situation creates an allocation 
problem for agricultural lenders when they seek to support growth in the smallholder 
agriculture sector, without charging high interest rates, which could stifle smallholder 
growth and add to the risk of the financed projects defaulting.  It is conceivable that 
lenders would try to shorten loan terms in such a situation to avoid tying up funds for 
long periods, and make credit available to more borrowers.  It is therefore important to 
understand what role loan term plays in the credit supply function. 
Similarly, smallholders are more likely to access credit when they borrow as a 
group rather than when they borrow as individuals.  Peer-selected groups can potentially 
offer several benefits to the borrower, including ease and cost of monitoring, greater 
ability for the group to jointly raise collateral for loans, and peer pressure to repay loans 
borrowed on joint-liability terms.  We are therefore interested in analyzing to what 
extent such groups, mainly cooperatives in the market we study, influence the lender’s 
willingness to supply credit over other borrowers, everything else being equal. 
Furthermore, we are interested in understanding the role in credit supply of the 
availability of contracted markets to borrowers prior to borrowing.  It is expected that the 
lender would prefer borrowers with market contracts prior to borrowing than those 
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without.  Borrowers with contracted markets are those that have supply contracts with 
buyers for their produce before they borrow to finance the production. Markets for 
agricultural produce in Zambia are not always guaranteed, and this places a risk on both 
borrowers and lenders, especially when it involves the production of highly perishable 
crops. Market contracts guarantee the producers (who are the borrowers) of the 
quantities and prices at which they will be able to sell. They are therefore able to forecast 
their incomes more accurately, and minimize the risk of loss due to lack of markets or 
lower prices, than those with open market arrangements. This also benefits lenders as it 
reduces the risk of default by borrowers. We therefore examine what role access to 
contracted markets by borrowers has in the lender’s supply of credit. 
The supply model developed includes all the key variables discussed above.  
That is, the dependent variable is supply of credit, or the dollar value of the loan for each 
borrower, and the independent variables are real interest rates, loan fees, loan term, and 
binary variables for contracted market availability and type of borrower (cooperative or 
investor owned agribusiness).  The model is shown in equation 18. 
 
(18)    MKTCOOPTERMFEERATESUP 543210 ββββββ +++++= ,  
 
where SUP is the supply of credit, RATE is the real interest rate, FEE is the loan fee, 
TERM is the loan term, COOP is the binary variable for borrower type, and MKT is the 
binary variable for availability of contracted market to the borrower.  Table 15 gives a 
detailed description of the key economic variables expected to affect credit supply and 
the expected signs of the relationship. 
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Table 15. Description of Loan-Level Variables 
Symbol Variable Description Mean (Std Dev) 
Expected 
Sign 
SUP Credit 
Supply 
Dependent variable; supply of credit by 
the lender or loan amount, in US $ 
$ 47,664 
($ 65,677)  
RATE Interest 
Rate 
Real interest rate charged on the loan, 
in decimal form. 
0.54 
(0.38) + 
FEE Loan Fees Loan fees charged on the loan, in US $ $ 1,585 
($ 1,999) + 
TERM Loan Term Loan term, in years 2.56 years 
(3.46 years) – 
MKT Commodity 
Market 
Binary variable for borrower’s 
commodity market; 1 if contracted, 0 
otherwise 
= 1 if contracted 
market + 
COOP Cooperative Binary variable for type of borrower; 1 
if a cooperative, 0 otherwise = 1 if cooperative – 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
A relationship between loan term and contract market availability was 
established by ordering all loans with access to contract markets, that is, for which the 
variable MKT took the value of 1, and those without contract markets.  Only loans with 
loan terms ranging from 0.10 years (6 weeks) to 2.96 years had contract markets. All 
loans longer than 2.96 years had no market contracts.  In terms of the number of loans, 
loans longer than 2.96 years were more than those that were shorter. Long terms loans, 
which are almost all for infrastructure development and equipment are collateralized by 
a placement of a lien on the loaned infrastructure and equipment. Thus these loans are 
less risky than the shorter uncollateralized loans. The loan contracts for long term loans 
are subject to termination if the conditions of the contract are not met by the borrowers. 
Since the model is used to analyze credit supply at both the individual level and 
the firm loan level, the data are aggregated for analysis at the firm level, where 
aggregation of interest rates and loan term for multi-loan observations is achieved as 
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described earlier (page 48).  Table 16 shows the aggregated data for all borrowers in the 
portfolio and some summary statistics. 
 
Table 16. Firm-Level Loan Data 
 SUP 
(US$) 
REAL RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
FEE 
(US$) 
TERM 
(YEARS)
MKT 
(BINARY) 
COOP 
(BINARY)
     1,199.04  0.029 0.83 0.10 1 0
     5,850.00  0.106 117.00 0.25 1 0
     8,677.14  0.085 216.93 0.25 1 0
   13,100.02  0.020 345.37 9.86 0 1
   13,980.82  0.023 349.52 0.33 1 0
   14,388.49  0.071 143.88 0.25 1 1
   14,551.56  0.131 436.55 0.25 1 1
   18,681.06  0.039 931.20 2.75 0 1
   20,000.00  0.129 3,000.00 0.33 1 0
   20,983.21  0.020 382.28 0.75 0 0
   30,920.14  0.020 2,566.80 8.25 0 1
   38,889.27  0.023 3,657.92 3.83 0 1
   40,000.00  0.096 3,500.00 0.50 0 0
   41,719.94  0.103 1,044.61 0.24 1 0
   50,969.76  0.023 1,292.57 3.42 0 1
   55,155.88  0.040 551.56 0.25 1 1
   58,443.34  0.047 4,324.29 1.07 0 1
   62,278.18  0.063 1,868.35 3.00 1 0
   71,000.00  0.096 836.48 0.49 1 0
   76,738.61  0.089 1,939.16 0.32 1 0
   83,016.28  0.026 5,866.42 4.88 1 1
   86,275.03  0.096 2,597.39 5.08 0 1
   88,053.13  0.096 2,636.35 6.86 0 1
 105,027.39  0.059 2,849.34 6.04 0 1
 120,000.00  0.097 5,500.00 1.00 1 0
 132,624.06  0.035 6,351.35 6.38 1 1
 210,000.00  0.104 5,250.00 3.00 1 0
 450,000.00  0.091 13,843.38 0.45 1 0
 450,000.00  0.097 11,186.12 0.49 1 0
 525,000.00 0.096 13,125.00 0.41 1 0
   
Min. 1,199.04 0.020 0.83 0.10  
Max. 525,000.00 0.131 13,843.38 9.86  
Mean 96,917.41 0.068 3,223.69 2.37  
Std. Dev. 136,432.75 0.036 3,732.96 2.80  
Total 2,907,522.34 96,710.65 19 14
    Note: For descriptions of column headings, please see Table 15. 
    Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
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Parameters for the supply model are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression (OLS).  OLS is a basic econometric method which explains a dependent 
variable (Y) in terms of one or more independent variables (X) (Wooldridge 2003).  The 
relationship can be expressed as: 
uXY ++= 10 ββ  
where Y is the dependent variable, β0 is the intercept parameter, β1 is the slope 
parameter(s), X is the explanatory variable(s), and u is the error term.  The slope 
parameter, β1, is the more significant indicator in an OLS model as it shows the 
relationship between X and Y when all other factors in the model are held constant 
(Wooldridge 2003).  The term u is introduced to capture the effects of all other 
influences on the dependent variable, some of which may not be known to us, and any 
approximation error made when we assumed the model was linear. 
OLS is known as the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).  However, the 
following Gauss-Markov conditions must be satisfied for OLS to give an unbiased 
estimate of the linear model (Wooldridge 2003): 
1. model must be linear in parameters, 
2. zero conditional mean; that is, for each observation, the expected error 
term is zero, 
3. no perfect collinearity; independent variables must not be constant or a 
perfect linear combination of other variables in the model, 
4. homoskedasticity; the variance of the error term on all independent 
variables must be equal across observations, 
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5. no serial correlation; conditional on the independent variables, the errors 
must not be correlated across observations. 
The data used in the model are tested for collinearity.  A simple way to test 
collinearity is by using sample correlation coefficients between pairs of explanatory 
variables that can indicate linear relationships between them (Griffiths, Hill and Judge 
1993).  A commonly used rule of thumb is that a correlation coefficient between two 
explanatory variables greater than 0.8 or 0.9 indicates a strong linear association and a 
potentially harmful collinear relationship (Griffiths, Hill and Judge 1993). 
The model results are also tested for heteroskedasticity of errors.  
Heteroskedasticity describes a situation where the error term is changing rather than 
constant across observations.  There may be reason to believe that error terms associated 
with very large firms will have greater variance than those associated with small firms 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).  The assumption that errors corresponding to different 
observations are independent and therefore uncorrelated is important in both time-series 
and cross section studies (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991).  The Gauss-Markov assumption 
of homoskedasticity (assumption 4) is needed to justify the t tests, F tests, and 
confidence levels for ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the linear regression 
model, even with cross-sectional data, as is the case with our data after aggregation.  It is 
therefore necessary to test for the presence of heteroskedastic error variance in the model 
to assure model robustness and ensure that results are not biased.  If Var(u|x) is not 
constant, OLS is no longer the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) as given by the 
Gauss-Markov theorem.  Although heteroskedasticity does not bias the estimator, it 
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leads to loss of efficiency, which is also an important problem in econometric 
estimation.  That is, the observed data points will tend to deviate more and more from 
the estimated mean function.  The data in this study are tested for heteroskedastic error 
variance. 
For the linear model shown in equation 19, we take the null hypothesis that the 
assumption of homoskedasticity – represented by equation 20 – is true and then prove its 
violation (Wooldridge 2003). 
 
(19)    uxxy kk +++++= ββββ ...2110  
(20)    22210 )(),...,,(: σ== uExxxuVarH k   
Because we are assuming u has a zero conditional expectation, Var(u|x) = 
E(u2|x), and the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is equivalent to 
 
(21)    2221
2
0 )(),...,,(: σ== uExxxuEH k    
      
In other words, we find a test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, 
, where N is the number of observations (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1991).  A simple test proposed by Goldfeld and Quandt tests if the ratio of 
two variance estimators follows an F distribution with [(T1 – K1), (T2 – K2)] degrees of 
freedom, where Tk and Kk refer to the number of observations and number of 
coefficients in each of the subsets of observations, respectively (Griffiths, Hill and Judge 
22
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2
2
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2003).  The Goldfeld-Quandt statistic when the null hypothesis ( ) is true is 
given by equation 22. 
2
2
2
10 : σσ =H
(22)     )](),[(2
2
2
1
2211
~
ˆ
ˆ
KTKTFGQ −−= σ
σ , 
where σ12 is the error variance for the subset of the data thought to be associated with 
higher error variance, and σ22 is the error variance for the subset of the data thought to be 
associated with lower error variance.  If the residual variances associated with each 
regression are approximately equal, the homoskedasticity assumption can not be 
rejected, which supports the conditions for OLS to be the best linear model. But, if the 
residual variance increases substantially across the observations, we reject the null 
hypothesis.  We can reject the null hypothesis at a chosen level of significance if the 
calculated significance is greater than the critical value of the F distribution. 
For our cross section data, we assume that the variable that may give rise to 
heteroskedastic error variance is the loan fee, due to the wide variation in the 
observations for this variable.  To do the Goldfeld-Quandt test, we order the data by loan 
fees and run regressions on two subsets determined by inspecting the residuals (the 
estimates of the error) from an initial regression. 
Serial correlation is assumed non-existent in the data set as it is a pure cross-
section after aggregation into a firm-level model.  As multi-loan observations which 
occur in different time periods are aggregated into single observations, serial correlation 
which is associated with time-series data is controlled for.  Further, the short lending 
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period involved (under three years) strengthens this assumption.  No tests for serial 
correlation are therefore necessary to support this model. 
To allow more detailed analysis and allow for non-linear relationships in the 
credit supply model, a model is estimated as a second degree (quadratic) function in 
variable FEE, the loan fees.  It is conceivable that the marginal effects of loan fees on 
supply would diminish at sufficiently high loan fee levels.  This is expected as very high 
loan fees would decrease the number of clients or borrowers seeking credit from the 
lender.  As a result, the lender would have to reduce loan fees until the market clears 
again.  The quadratic term allows for curvature in the supply function, but is still a linear 
model in the parameters, so we can use OLS.  This situation is presented graphically in 
figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Non-Linear Credit Supply Function 
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The supply function above can be presented mathematically by the equation 
(23)     2212 PPS ββα ++=
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where S is the dependent variable, supply, and P is the independent variable which may 
have diminishing or increasing marginal effect on supply.  Gloy, Gunderson and LaDue 
(2005) use similar specification in which they develop a model for interest rate margin 
and loan servicing costs that are both quadratic in loan volume, using borrower-level 
data from agricultural lending relationships in the U.S.  The general non-linear credit 
supply model can be represented by equation 24: 
 
(24)     eMKTCOOPTERMFEEFEERATESUP +++++++= 65423210 βββββββ
 
in which FEE is the quadratic variable whose marginal effect on supply is expected to 
diminish as fees increase.  The expected sign for the quadratic term, or the coefficient β3, 
is therefore negative if it is indeed diminishing.  The t-statistic and p-value 
corresponding to the quadratic term in the non-linear model are used to determine 
whether this variable is significant in the model or not.  If economies of scale exist in the 
credit supply with regard to loan fees, then the marginal effect of fees on supply would 
decline as fees increase, if savings are passed on. 
This chapter provided the data and econometric approaches that are used to 
analyze the supply of credit that ZATAC provided to the Zambian agribusiness sector 
during its initial phase of rapid growth.  The $2.9 million portfolio includes loans to 
cooperatives, women-led firms, and large businesses involved in international trade.  
The pricing mechanisms include interest rates that are low in real terms, and a major 
component of fees to the non-profit lender.  These factors are analyzed econometrically 
in a supply function whose parameters will provide estimates about key determinants of 
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ZATAC’s lending in its initial years of operation.  The next chapter gives the model 
results and regression diagnostics, and discusses the economic implications of those 
results. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Results and Analysis Based on Full Loan Portfolio 
A model of the key economic variables hypothesized to influence credit supply was 
estimated using firm-level data.  Credit supply was estimated using equation 18. Real 
interest rates were used in the regression.  The results of the regression are shown in 
table 17, while descriptions of the model variables are given in table 15. The full 
ZATAC smallholder loan portfolio was used in this analysis.  
In the second analysis presented later in the chapter, the three largest agribusiness 
firms were dropped as they were found to have significant differences from the rest of 
the firms. One of the differences between these three firms and the rest was that they 
were able to access much larger loan amounts from the lender because they were well 
established businesses with much larger total assets than the rest of the portfolio’s 
borrowers. Plots of credit supply against interest rates, loan fees and loan terms all 
showed that the three large agribusinesses were outliers in the population (figures 9, 10 
and 11). Our primary interest is credit supply to the firms excluding the three outliers as 
they represent the true smallholder borrowers in the portfolio. The analysis of the 
smaller firms forms the basis for the important conclusions in the study. The later 
analysis also separates the loan data into two sub-groups based on the currency of loan 
disbursement to give a better understanding of supply patterns to borrowers in the two 
categories. This analysis is important because of the differences in the loan pricing 
 69
structures for local currency (Kwacha) loans and dollar-denominated loans, as explained 
earlier in the data chapter. 
The results and analysis of the full ZATAC smallholder loan portfolio are, 
nevertheless, presented in order to understand the lender’s supply decisions to all 
borrowers in the portfolio. 
 
Table 17. Regression Estimates and Summary Statistics of ZATAC Credit Supply 
Model 
  Intercept 
REAL 
INTEREST 
RATE 
FEE TERM COOP MKT 
Coefficient -70,667.57 79,245.96 33.99 5,926.08 -1,776.19 73,814.10 
t-test -2.296 0.314 15.446 1.349 -0.083 3.155 
Prob(t) 0.031 0.756 0.000 0.190 0.935 0.004 
R2 0.921      
F-statistic 55.792      
GQ-statistic 11.11      
Notes:    1. Number of Observations = 30 
2. Units of dependent variable, Credit Supply, are in US dollars. 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
The results show that only loan fees and availability of contracted market have 
significant explanatory power in the model.  Real interest rates, loan term and the 
cooperative binary variable all have low t-statistics (that is, less than the critical value of 
tc = 1.96) and high p-values.  For instance, real interest rate has a t-statistic of 0.314 and 
a p-value of 0.756, and loan term has corresponding figures of 1.349 and 0.190 
respectively.  A p-value of 0.190 indicates that the hypothesized variable has a 0.190 
probability of not explaining the dependent variable.  Interest rate therefore is highly 
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insignificant with a p-value of 0.756.  Similarly the borrower type binary variable, 
COOP, is insignificant. 
Loan fees and availability of contracted markets, on the other hand, have a 
significant influence on supply.  The first is consistent with basic economic theory and 
the findings by Gloy, Gunderson and LaDue.  Loan fee income is risk-free as the lender 
receives the fees before loan disbursement.  This risk-free income feature is a key 
determinant of the lender’s decision to supply funds.  The relationship between loan fees 
and credit supply is positive as expected.  For every $1.00 increase in loan fees, supply 
of credit will increase by $33.99, all other factors remaining constant. A plot of firm-
level credit supply versus loan fees is shown in figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Firm-Level Credit Supply versus Loan Fees 
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The results show the positive relationship between credit supply and real interest 
rate that one would expect based on economic theory.  For every one percentage point 
increase in real interest rates, supply is predicted to increase by $ 79,246 (table 17).  
However, the statistical results further suggest that interest rates do not significantly 
influence the lender’s decision to supply credit to borrowers, other factors held constant.  
This result is consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss’ finding that interest rates do not clear 
the market in credit markets with significant information asymmetries as in the case of 
this lender’s credit market. Figure 10 shows a scatter plot of supply function versus real 
interest rates. 
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Figure 10. Firm-Level Credit Supply Function versus Real Interest Rates 
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The regression results further show an unexpected relationship between supply 
and loan term.  Theoretically, one would expect that in a market characterized by low 
credit availability to meet a high demand for loanable funds, lenders would tend to prefer 
shorter terms than longer ones.  The results, however, show that the lender lent $5,926 
more funds for every one year increase in loan term.  This unexpected relationship may 
suggest a stronger willingness by the lender to provide longer term loans to enable 
smallholder growth than the motivation for pure economic gain that could potentially 
accrue from higher loan turnover. Figure 11 is a plot of supply versus loan term. 
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Figure 11. Firm-Level Credit Supply versus Loan Term 
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On average other things held constant, cooperatives are likely to receive $1,776 
less credit than investor owned agribusinesses.  This result is consistent with the 
mechanism of progressive lending employed by microfinance institutions to minimize 
the downside risk of default (Morduch 1999).  Under progressive lending, the lender 
typically begins by lending small amounts and then increasing the loan amount over time 
upon satisfactory repayment.  The repeated nature of the interactions can be used by the 
lender to overcome information problems and improve supply efficiency. 
Borrowers with contracted markets, that is, whose financed product has a 
contracted market at the time of borrowing, have a credit supply advantage averaging 
$73,814 above that accessed by other borrowers with no market contracts.  Seasonal 
price fluctuations experienced in agricultural markets pose considerable income risks on 
producers (borrowers) and consequently agricultural lenders.  Contract production 
hedges downside income risk when prices are lower, but also limits potential upside 
revenue when prices are higher than the contracted prices.  Lenders are primarily 
concerned about the downside risk and therefore price the risk-reducing benefits of 
contracts highly in this type of market.  The agro products market is further complicated 
by the perishable nature of many primary commodities, such as milk, which need to be 
sold soon after production/harvest.  Access to pre-contracted markets is therefore a 
crucial factor in minimizing the risk of revenue loss due to damage and is found to be a 
key incentive for ZATAC to supply credit. 
 74
A quadratic supply model was estimated using equation 24. The regression 
diagnostics are shown in table 18, while model variable nomenclature is given in table 
15. 
Table 18. Regression Estimates and Summary Statistics of Quadratic Credit Supply 
Model 
  Intercept 
REAL 
INTEREST 
RATE
FEE FEE2 TERM COOP MKT
Coefficient -35,471.87 231,804.51 15.17 0.001 5,925.36 -5,635.99 39,583.17
t-test -1.112 0.966 1.845 2.363 1.472 -0.285 1.530
Prob(t) 0.277 0.344 0.078 0.027 0.154 0.778 0.140
R2 0.936  
F-statistic 56.308  
GQ-
statistic 14.71  
Notes:    1. Number of Observations = 30 
2. Units of dependent variable, Credit Supply, are in US dollars. 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
Compared with the linear model, the quadratic model shows a much higher 
influence of real rates on supply, but also that the benefits to market contract and loan 
fees are lower by half.  The beta coefficient for the quadratic term is positive and very 
small (0.001), showing very little curvature in the supply function.  These two results 
indicate that there were no economies of scale effects on loan fees, or at least if there 
were any, the lender had not started passing them on to borrowers.  This result is not 
surprising given the short period the lender has been in operation, in which the cost of 
servicing and monitoring borrowers may still be too high to exhibit economies of scale 
in the provision of credit. 
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The supply model was tested for heteroskedasticity of errors by dividing the data 
set into two categories ordered, smallest to largest, by loan amount.  The basis for the 
determining the cutoff for the two sub-groups was an examination of the errors in the 
first supply regression.  The first fourteen observations form the group associated with a 
lower error variance, while the last sixteen form the group associated with a larger error 
variance.  Figure 12 shows an error variance plot for the full population. 
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Figure 12. Error Variance Plot for Credit Supply Model 
 
The Goldfeld-Quandt statistic for the model test was 11.11.  The corresponding 
critical value for the F distribution, with degrees of freedom (v1=9, v2=11) at the 5% 
confidence level is 2.90. Thus G-Q > Fc, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity.  This can also been seen from a plot of the residuals for the quadratic 
model.  Figure 13 shows the residuals of both linear and quadratic models.  A similar 
pattern of increasing error variance is observed. That is, the data exhibits heteroskedastic 
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error variance.  This causes loss of efficiency in the supply model, and requires to be 
corrected for. 
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Figure 13. Residuals from Linear and Quadratic Models 
 
To correct for the heteroskedastic errors in the model data, we use weighted least 
squares (WLS) estimation, which is more efficient than OLS estimation when the data 
exhibits heteroskedastic error variance (Wooldridge 2006).  WLS leads to new t and F 
statistics that have t and F distributions. The WLS procedure calculates estimators (βj*s) 
that minimize the weighted sum of squared residuals, where the squared residual is 
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weighted by 1/h, and h is a function of the explanatory variables that determines the 
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge 2006). 
The data was analyzed for collinearity between independent variables.  This was 
achieved by examining the correlation matrix for all the variables used in the model.  
The correlation matrix is shown below: 
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Using the commonly used rule of thumb that a correlation coefficient between 
two explanatory variables greater than 0.8 or 0.9 indicates a strong linear association and 
a potentially harmful collinear relationship (Griffiths, Hill and Judge 1993), we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the variables are uncorrelated.  We can therefore use the 
data without requiring correction for collinearity.  That is, the supply model satisfies the 
Gauss-Markov assumption that no perfect collinearity between independent variables 
must exist for the ordinary least squares to yield the best linear unbiased estimates of the 
model parameters. 
 
Analysis of Credit Supply to Currency-Based Portfolio Sub-Groups 
The data was separated on the basis of currency of loan disbursement to enable 
separate analysis of credit supply to export-oriented firms that borrow in US dollars and 
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firms that have domestic markets and thus borrow in the Zambian local currency, 
Kwacha. In this analysis, the three large agribusinesses identified earlier as outliers were 
dropped from the data set. The three firms had a total of eight (8) loans amongst them. 
Dropping the three firms from the data analysis allows us to analyze the lender’s supply 
decisions to firms that are more comparable to one another, and represent the 
smallholder borrowers, whose access to credit is of interest in this study. Important 
conclusions on the lender’s supply of credit to smallholders are therefore based on this 
analysis. 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics for the local currency sub-group, at the 
loan level. Descriptions of the model variables are given in table 15. There were 45 
individual loans to 20 firms in this sub-group. Thirty seven (37) of the loans went to 
cooperatives. Twelve (12) loans financed production that had contract markets. The total 
loan amount under this subgroup was ZMK 4,035,629,075. This amount is equivalent to 
US$ 994,965.32 when converted at the exchange rate of US$1.00 to ZMK 4,056.05, the 
average exchange rate for the lending period under consideration (Central Statistical 
Office, 2007). Analysis of supply for the local currency loans sub-group was, however, 
done with supply expressed in the currency of disbursement to avoid introducing 
exchange rate errors in the model. 
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for Local Currency Loans Sub-Group 
 
SUPPLY 
(ZMK) 
NOMINAL 
INTEREST 
RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
REAL 
INTEREST 
RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
FEE 
(ZMK) 
TERM 
(YEARS) 
COOP 
(BINARY) 
MKT 
(BINARY) 
Min 
   
100,000 0.159 0.007 2,218 0.10     
Max 259,700,000 0.220 0.131 
  
21,227,312 9.86     
Mean 89,680,646 0.185 0.049 
  
3,628,389 3.41     
SD 80,185,472 0.012 0.037 
  
4,722,054 3.90     
Sum 4,035,629,075   
   
163,277,487   37 12 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the firm-level local currency loans sub-group are given 
in table 20. The model variable nomenclature is given in table 15. Interest rates and loan 
term are weighted by loan amount as before. There are 20 observations in the subgroup, 
representing 20 firms. Average loan amount for firms borrowing local currency loans 
was ZMK 201.8 million (equivalent to US$ 49,750). After aggregating at the firm-level, 
average nominal and real interest rates are slightly higher (0.186 and 0.052 respectively) 
than the corresponding figures for individual loans in the sub-group. The average loan 
term for local currency loan borrowers is 3.19 years. 
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics for Local Currency Loans Sub-Group at the  
Firm-Level 
 
SUPPLY 
(ZMK) 
NOMINAL 
RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
REAL 
RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
FEE 
(ZMK) 
TERM 
(YEARS) 
COOP 
(BINARY) 
MKT 
(BINARY) 
Min 5,000,000 0.159 0.020 
            
3,444 0.10     
Max 553,042,335 0.220 0.131 
       
26,485,137 9.86     
Mean 201,781,454 0.186 0.052 
         
8,163,874  3.19     
SD 156,475,452 0.014 0.033 
         
7,962,624  3.09     
Sum 4,035,629,075   
      
163,277,487   14 8 
Note:   Number of Observations = 20 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics for the dollar-denominated sub-group. 
The descriptions for the variables in the table are given in table 15. The average loan 
term for the group, 0.76 years (9 months) was much lower than local currency 
denominated loans. Nominal rates were lower for dollar loans than for Kwacha loans, 
although higher in terms of real interest rates. The average loan amount for firms 
borrowing dollar loans was higher (US$ 64,343) than firms borrowing local currency 
loans. 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for US$-Denominated Loans Sub-Group 
 
SUPPLY 
(USD) 
NOMINAL RATE 
(DECIMAL) 
FEE 
(USD) 
TERM 
(YEARS) MKT 
Min         5,850  0.085       117.00 0.25   
Max      210,000  0.129    5,500.00 3.00   
Mean       64,343  0.102    2,087.61 0.76   
SD       69,763  0.013    2,299.36 0.94   
Sum      514,746    16,700.87  6 
Note:   Number of Observations = 8 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
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All firms that borrowed dollar-denominated loans had single loans, except the 
three large agribusinesses that were dropped from the analysis. The remaining data set 
on loan-level, dollar-denominated loans, is therefore also the firm-level data set for this 
sub-group. 
 
Regression Results from the Currency-Based Portfolio Sub-Groups 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate parameters for the 
supply of credit to each sub-group of the loan portfolio. The model expresses supply as a 
linear function of nominal and real interest rates, loan fees, loan term, and binary 
variables for contract market and borrower type (cooperative or agribusiness company). 
Separate regressions were estimated for the two sub-groups with both nominal and real 
interest rates. Table 22 shows the regression parameters, estimated using equation 18, for 
the local currency loans sub-group, using nominal interest rates. Descriptions of the 
model variables are given in table 15. The model estimates were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity of error variance in loan fees. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic for the 
uncorrected model was 4.60 with a p-value 0.0319 of being greater than the critical 
value for the χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom, leading to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and the conclusion that heteroskedasticity exists. 
Heteroskedasticity leads to loss of efficiency in the model, thus requires correction. The 
reported statistics in table 22 are from the corrected model. 
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Table 22. Regression Estimates for Kwacha Loans Sub-Group Using Nominal 
Rates 
  Intercept 
NOMINAL 
INTEREST 
RATE
FEE TERM COOP MKT
Coefficient 69,549,940 -251,112,000 12.80 5,456,739 -7,665,356 41,388,143
t-test 0.31 -0.22 3.90 1.22 -0.24 1.15
Prob(t) 0.7542 0.8289 <0.001 0.2223 0.8113 0.2490
R2 0.5160  
F-statistic 8.47  
Notes:    1. Number of Observations = 45 
2. Units of dependent variable, Credit Supply, are in Zambian Kwacha. 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
The regression estimates in table 22 show that at the 25% confidence level, loan 
fees, loan term and market are significant explanatory variables for the supply of 
Kwacha-denominated credit. Considering the small size of the data set after splitting the 
data into two groups, a 25% confidence level is a reasonable cutoff level for the 
significance of supply model parameters. The F-statistic (8.47) for the supply model 
using nominal interest rates is large, showing that jointly, the variables included in the 
model have significant explanatory power. 
The regression estimates show that a ZMK 1.00 increase in loan fees is 
associated with an increase of ZMK 12.80 in Kwacha-denominated loans. A positive 
relationship exists between loan term and supply of Kwacha loans. A one year increase 
in loan term corresponds to a ZMK 5.46 million (US$ 1,345) increase in credit supply. 
This rather unexpected relationship between loan term and credit supply, which was also 
observed before splitting the data into two sub-groups, seems to suggest a stronger 
willingness by the lender to provide longer term loans to enable smallholder growth than 
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the motivation for pure economic gain that could potentially accrue from higher loan 
turnover.  
The regression estimates also show that the lender will supply ZMK 41.4 million 
(US$10,200) more credit to borrowers with market contracts at the time of borrowing 
that to borrowers with open market arrangements. Borrowers with contracted markets 
are those that have entered into supply contracts with buyers for their produce and 
borrow to finance the contracted production. As markets for agricultural produce in 
Zambia are not always guaranteed, open market arrangements often place a risk on both 
borrowers and lenders, especially when the production of highly perishable crops is 
involved. Market contracts guarantee the producers (who are the borrowers) of the 
quantities and prices at which they will be able to sell their produce. Borrowers with 
market contracts are therefore able to forecast their incomes more accurately, and 
minimize the risk of loss due to lack of markets or lower prices, than those with open 
market arrangements. This also benefits lenders as it, in turn, reduces the risk of default 
by the borrowers.  The lender’s willingness to supply larger loans to borrowers with 
market contracts indicates that the lender makes use of the risk-reducing effect of market 
contracts in its lending decisions. 
The model shows that nominal interest rates do not significantly affect the 
lender’s credit supply decisions. This is consistent with the theory of credit rationing in 
markets with information asymmetries, in which interest rates do not always lead to 
market clearing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
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The corresponding regression estimates, using equation 18, for the Kwacha loans 
sub-group using real interest rates are given in table 23. The supply model variables are 
described in table 15. At the 5% confidence level, only loan fees have significant 
explanatory power in the model, using either nominal or real interest rates. At the 25% 
level, real interest rates and loan term also have a significant influence on credit supply. 
The F-statistic for the joint significance of all variables in the model is also large 
enough, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the variables do not explain 
credit supply. 
 
Table 23. Regression Estimates for Kwacha Loans Sub-Group Using Real Rates 
  Intercept 
REAL 
INTEREST 
RATE
FEE TERM COOP MKT
Coefficient 19,979,007 423,703,750 12.27 5,556,490 -20,298,820 18,425,882
t-test 0.45 1.19 4.03 1.31 -0.69 0.52
Prob(t) 0.6522 0.2350 <0.001 0.1902 0.4873 0.6001
R2 0.5468  
F-statistic 9.52  
Notes:    1. Number of Observations = 45 
2. Units of dependent variable, Credit Supply, are in Zambian Kwacha. 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
ZATAC Limited uses historic inflation rates to determine nominal interest rates. 
If credit markets function well, supply of credit is related to the price or interest rate. 
Lenders who are profit-maximizing will add a component to the interest rate charged to 
cover the expected loss due to inflation. Expected inflation is therefore, in theory, the 
basis for the differential between real and nominal rates. A lender can use a naïve 
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forecast that assumes future inflation will be the same as today’s inflation. An 
improvement to ZATAC’s method of determining nominal interest rates, given the high 
fluctuations in inflation rates in its market, would therefore be to forecast future inflation 
rates and use these, together with the real interest rate, to price the Kwacha loans. 
Equation 18 was used to estimate the credit supply model parameters for the 
dollar loans sub-group, and the results are given in table 24. Model variable 
nomenclature is earlier described in table 15. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic for 
heteroskedasticity of error variance in the model conditioned on loan fees is 0.81 with a 
p-value of 0.3695. We therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
and conclude that the error variance is constant. No correction for the problem of 
heteroskedasticity was necessary for the dollar loans sub-group. As was the case with the 
Kwacha loans sub-group, the dependent variable, supply, is also given in the currency of 
loan disbursement (US dollars in this case). Note that the binary variable, COOP, which 
defines whether the borrower was a cooperative or not is omitted from this sub-group 
because no cooperatives borrowed dollar-denominated loans. 
The estimated parameters show that loan fees and market are significant at the 
25% significance level. The 25% significance level is again chosen because of the 
limited size of the sample under consideration. After dropping the three large 
agribusinesses, the dollar loans sub-group only had eight observations corresponding to 
eight loans given to eight firms. For every US$ 1.00 increase in loan fees, credit supply 
to dollar loan borrowers increased by US$ 39.32, which is more than three times the 
corresponding increase Kwacha loan borrowers would receive for an equal increase in 
 86
loan fees. Other things being equal, borrowers with market contracts for the financed 
project received US$ 106,369 more than their counterparts without market contracts. 
Compared to Kwacha loan borrowers, this represents an increase that is 10 times the 
increase in credit supply to Kwacha loan borrowers with market contracts. 
 
Table 24. Regression Estimates for Dollar Loans Sub-Group Using Nominal Rates 
  Intercept
NOMINAL 
INTEREST 
RATE
FEE TERM MKT
Coefficient -86,665 -98,615 39.32 -1,046.73 106,369
t-test -1.02 -0.17 2.19 -0.03 1.77
Prob(t) 0.3809 0.8773 0.1167 0.9770 0.1747
R2 0.9686  
F-statistic 9.52  
Breusch-Pagan 0.81  
Pr > χ2 0.3695  
Notes:    1. Number of Observations = 8 
2. Units of dependent variable, Credit Supply, are in US dollars. 
Source: ZATAC Limited, March 2007. 
 
 
The supply differentials between the Kwacha and dollar loans seem to reflect the 
risk posed by higher fluctuations in the inflation rates on which the nominal interest rates 
for Kwacha loans are based, compared to the LIBOR rates which are the lender’s basis 
for setting nominal rates on dollar loans. LIBOR rates, on the other hand, were much 
more stable at an average rate of 4.74%, with a standard deviation of 0.75%, during the 
lending period under consideration (British Bankers Association 2007). However, for 
each sub-group when considered separately, the lender’s supply decisions are not 
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significantly influenced by nominal interest rates. Furthermore, the lender’s development 
objective and the fact that a large portion of the funds received in dollars by the lender 
are disbursed in the same currency (dollars) could also explain the lack of a significant 
relationship between supply and interest rates. 
Although loan term has the expected negative coefficient, it is also not a 
significant determinant of the lender’s decisions to supply credit to firms borrowing in 
US dollars. A negative coefficient on loan term implies that the lender will lend fewer 
funds for longer term loans than it will for shorter term ones. In this case, every one year 
increase in loan term is associated with a decrease of US$ 1,047 in credit supply. This 
result suggests that the lender does in fact prefer shorter term loans to longer term loans 
for established agribusinesses which generally borrow in dollars, although it is willing to 
supply longer term loans to smallholders, as was found in the analysis of supply to the 
Kwacha loans sub-group.  
The R2 and F statistics for the dollar loans sub-group are high, at 0.9686 and 9.52 
respectively. However, a limitation of the estimated parameters for this sub-group is that 
the results do not have a high level of stastical significance because of the small sample 
size. 
In summary, the results of the analysis based on the separated loan data showed 
that loan fees and access to contracted markets are the key pricing factors for the 
lender’s supply of credit to smallholder agricultural producers and processors. In an 
agricultural credit market such as this lender’s, it is not difficult to see the economic 
rationale for the lender’s use of the availability of contracted markets to borrowers as a 
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key incentive to supply credit.  Contract production hedges downside income risk when 
prices are lower, and minimizes the lender’s default loss.  The perishable nature of many 
primary commodities in the agro-industry also makes pre-contracted production more 
favorable to borrowers and lenders. 
The study finds evidence of a strong correlation between loan term and credit 
supply to smallholders borrowing in the local currency. More than 75% of these 
borrowers were cooperatives.  A positive relationship between loan term and credit 
supply was found for this sub-group, suggesting that the lender may be more willing to 
support smallholder business growth with longer term loans rather than the pure profit 
motive, a finding that is consistent with the mission of the lender as a facilitator of 
smallholder agribusiness development.  
The quantitative analysis of credit supply allowed us to identify which of the key 
economic variables hypothesized to influence supply were really relevant in ZATAC’s 
lending between 2005 and 2007.  It further enabled quantification of the extent to which 
such factors tend to be associated with supply. The study finds that the lender’s supply 
decision is not strongly affected by nominal interest rates, a result that is supported by 
theory on credit rationing in markets with asymmetric information. On the other hand, 
real interest rates had a significant positive relationship with credit supply, suggesting 
that the lender is willing to supply larger loans at higher real interest rates. 
 
 89
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Credit supply in Zambia plays an important role in the commercialization of smallholder 
agribusiness.  Access to credit by smallholders through the commercial banking sector is 
limited by their inability to offer collateral for loans and lenders’ perception that they are 
generally risky borrowers.  Microfinance institutions therefore provide a key channel 
through which smallholder agricultural producers have access to credit.  Previous studies 
have highlighted mechanisms that microfinance institutions in developing countries have 
employed to ameliorate problems of asymmetric information in the supply of credit.  
The studies have focused on microfinance institutions that provide consumer loans and 
short term working capital for non-agricultural projects.  This study offers insights into 
smallholder credit supply in the agriculture industry, using data from a specialized 
agricultural lender in a developing country. The qualitative as well as quantitative 
analyses lead to several important conclusions about the economic and business factors 
that affect ZATAC’s supply of credit. 
Qualitatively, the study finds that ZATAC has both differences and similarities to 
the microfinance institutions studied in the development literature.  The similarities 
identified in this study demonstrate that the approach of joint liability and community 
pressures are extended from consumer lending into the agricultural credit sector in 
Zambia.  The cooperative structure is the source of joint liability and community 
pressure to repay. This works in two ways. Firstly because the cooperative members 
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self-select themselves, the selection process gives an incentive to members to screen out 
risky borrowers based on community-available information, when all the members are 
bound by a joint liability contract. Secondly, because the primary loan contract is 
between the lender and the cooperative, which in turn has sub-loan contracts with 
individual members, there is pressure on members to repay their loans or risk having 
them repossessed by the cooperative. Joint liability compels cooperative members to 
monitor each other’s investments and loan repayment. 
Access to multiple loans by more than half of the ZATAC borrowers suggested 
that the lender employs the mechanism of progressive lending commonly used by 
microfinance institutions. The repetitive nature of the lending relationship can help 
lenders overcome some information problems in supplying credit to their borrowers, and 
increase credit supply efficiency. The short lending period that the lender had been in 
operation could not, however, allow for an examination of whether these benefits do in 
fact accrue to the lender. 
The distinctions are mainly attributed to the mission and clientele ZATAC serves 
in commercializing agribusiness.  Key distinctions included lower real interest rates 
(averaging 4.9% for Kwacha loans, 10.2% for dollar loans, and 5.4% for the overall 
portfolio) offered by ZATAC compared to other microfinance institutions in other parts 
of the world, which ranged from 17 – 47%.  The sizes of loans that ZATAC provided to 
smallholders were generally larger than comparable microfinance institutions. 
Quantitatively, the study finds that loan fees and availability of contracted 
markets were the key determinants of credit supply by the lender.  For local currency 
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loans, supply of credit increased by ZMK 12.80 for every ZMK 1.00 increase in loan 
fees, all other factors remaining constant. The lender supplied ZMK 41.4 million 
(US$10,200) more credit to borrowers with market contracts at the time of borrowing 
than to borrowers with open market arrangements.  
The study further finds that a positive relationship existed between loan term and 
supply of Kwacha loans. A one year increase in loan term is associated with a ZMK 5.46 
million (US$ 1,345) increase in credit supply. This finding seemed to be consistent with 
the lender’s mission to facilitate smallholder agribusiness development by providing 
longer term loans to support smallholder growth. Collateral on long term loans also 
serve as an incentive for the lender to supply long term credit. This study finds that only 
loans with loan terms ranging from 0.10 years (6 weeks) to 2.96 years had contract 
markets while loans longer than 2.96 years had no market contracts.  Long terms loans, 
which were almost all for infrastructure development and equipment, were collateralized 
by a placement of a lien on the loaned infrastructure and equipment. Thus these loans are 
less risky than the shorter uncollateralized loans. The loan contracts for long term loans 
were also subject to termination if the conditions of the contract are not met by the 
borrowers. The long term loans (3 – 10 years) provided by ZATAC were specifically for 
infrastructure development and equipment such as construction or purchase of dairy 
marketing centers, milk cooling equipment and processing facilities, which served as 
collateral for the loans. 
For the dollar-denominated loans, loan fees and market contracts were the key 
determinants of the supply of credit. For every US$ 1.00 increase in loan fees, credit 
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supply increased by US$ 39.32, other things being equal. Furthermore, borrowers with 
market contracts for the financed project received US$ 106,369 more than their 
counterparts without market contracts in the dollar loans sub-group. 
The lender’s credit supply decisions to both local currency and dollar loan 
borrowers were not significantly influenced by nominal interest rates, a finding that was 
not entirely unexpected given the information asymmetries that exist in this lender’s 
credit market. This finding is consistent with literature on credit rationing in markets 
with imperfect information, in which interest rates do not always clear the markets 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The lender in this case relies on other factors such as loan fees 
and contracted markets to price credit supply to its borrowers. Despite the absence of a 
significant relationship between credit supply and nominal interest rates, an estimation 
of the supply-real interest rate relationship found that a significant positive correlation 
did in fact exist between credit supply and real interest rates.   
Regressions on the full loan portfolio data which included large agribusinesses 
that were markedly different in size and credit requirement characteristics gave insights 
into how the lender’s supply decisions to all borrowers of all sizes are affected by the 
key economic factors and business conditions in lender’s credit market. In general, the 
study finds that the same factors – real interest rates, loan term and loan fees – affect the 
supply of credit to the full spectrum of borrowers. However, large agribusinesses were 
able to access much larger credit supply from the lender at the same interest rates as their 
smaller counterparts. Considering the low interest rates offered by the lender, it seemed 
likely that a major incentive for the large agribusinesses, which otherwise had the 
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capacity to borrow from the commercial banking sector, was the ability to borrow from 
ZATAC at relatively lower nominal and real interest rates. 
A further analysis based on the full portfolio modeled supply as a quadratic 
function in loan fees and concluded that there was no evidence of economies of scale 
benefit to the lender being passed along to borrowers through lower fees. 
A major limitation of the study was the short lending period the lender had been 
in operation and hence the relatively small number of loans disbursed. Sufficient 
observations for the ZATAC data would allow further analysis of the effects of lender-
borrower relationship factors, such as length of lending relationship and borrowers’ use 
of other financial and development-oriented services by the lender, on supply of credit. 
Gloy, Gunderson and LaDue (2005) carried out similar analysis using U.S. data. Further 
research questions that are possible and can build on this study with availability of more 
loan data relate to the borrowers’ loan repayment performance over time, for example 
how length of the lending relationship affects repayment; the profitability and financial 
sustainability of the lender’s lending operations (including costs and returns profiles); 
and the effect on smallholder business growth as a result of increased access to credit 
supply. These questions are of importance to various stakeholders including lenders, 
policymakers and smallholder agribusinesses. 
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